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A Theory of Adjudication: Law as Magic

Jessie Allen 1
Law is a "strange compound which is brewed daily in the caldron of the
courts. "
Hon. Benjamin N. Cardozo

2

I. INTRODUCTION

At least since the Legal Realists' early twentieth-century critique, legal
theorists have struggled to understand the relationship between law and reason.
Other disciplines can help with that project. The longstanding trend toward
economic analysis is one well-developed approach. Recent scholarship looks
to both economics and psychology to analyze the law of risk.3 In this article, I
use anthropological theories of ritual and magic to reconsider the role of
doctrinal reasoning and formal procedure in adjudication and adjudication's
role in social change. I argue that aspects of law regarded as irrational "magic"
may contribute to adjudication's social effects and meaning.
The idea that law has something in common with magic is not new. In the
1920s and 1930s, the American Legal Realists expressed their critique of legal
rationality by complaining that judges practice "legal magic."4 According to
1. Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law. Many thanks to those who read
various incarnations of this work and gave thoughtful comments that improved it: Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Natasha Balendra, Keith Bybee, Peggy Cooper Davis, Jeffrey Fagan, Deep Gulasekaram, Suzanne Last Stone,
Michael Madow, Lawrence Rosen, Peter Strauss, Susan Sturm, Jeremy Waldron, Andrew Williams, and
Patricia J. Williams. Thanks also to Josh Launer and Emma Cecilia Eriksson for their editorial contributions.
2. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).
3 See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstem, ed. 2000).
4. Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and theFunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821
(1935). Across the Atlantic at around the same time, the Scandinavian Realists contended that modem legal
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the Realists, legal outcomes were actually determined by judges' individual
preferences and ideology. Traditional legal methods-precedential hierarchies,
doctrinal formulas, and procedural rules-were nothing but "magic solving
words," 5 "word ritual," 6 and "legal myth'

7

that obscured the real reasons for

court decisions. Although the most important Realist writings were produced
some seventy years ago, they exert a powerful continuing influence. 8 Today's
ascendant economic approach to legal analysis is a Realist descendent. And
while little has been written about the Realists' analysis of legal magic,
references to "talismanic" legal reasoning and "magic words" crop up with
some regularity in case law to this day. 9 Moreover, a few scholars have
recently begun again to recognize the connections among law, magic, and
ritual. 'o
I want to reconsider law's magical aspects in a way that both extends and
critiques Realism. I accept the core view of the Realists and of today's radical
legal critics and economic pragmatists that categorical doctrinal reasoning,
precedent, and formal procedures do not objectively determine legal
decisions."1 But I reject the assumption that those features of adjudication must
practice was historically descended from magic rituals. "According to the Roman view .. the right of
property is a mystical power over the spirit inherent in the object. This power is created, and transferred, by
means of magical acts ....All the ancient legal acts belonging to the original Roman law were magical acts."
Karl Olivecrona, The Legal Theories ofAxel Hagerstrrm and Vilhelm Lundstedt, 3 Sc. ST. L. 125, 133 (1959),
available at http://www.cenneth.com/sisl/pdf/3-5.pdf.
5. Cohen, supra note 4, at 820.
6. Leon Green, Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1016 (1928).
7. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 12 (2d ed. 1930).

8. "Legal realism has fundamentally altered our conceptions of legal reasoning and of the relationship
between law and society ....All major current schools of thought are, in significant ways, products of legal
realism." Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 467 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)); see also GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS:
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 32 (1995) ("[M]ost law teachers today regard themselves as

legal realists").
9. A Westlaw search for cases from 1945 to 2005 with the terms "magic words" or "talismanic"
generated 7,837 hits. See, e.g, State v. Robinson, 631 A.2d 288, 300 (Conn. 1993) ("The fact that the trial court
did not utter the talismanic words that the evidence was 'more probative than prejudicial' does not indicate that
it did not make such a determination"); State v. Lee, 1999 WL 19295, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan 20, 1999) ("A
trial court is not required to use 'magic words' in effectuating its adjudication"); Willington Fraternal Order of
Police Lodge #1 v. Bostrom, 1999 WL 39546, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 1999) ("Chancery jurisdiction is not
conferred by the incantation of magic words"). Scornful comparisons to magic also can be found in American
case law long before the Realists' rigorous critique. See, e.g., The President, Dirs. and Co. of the Bank of the
United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64, 113 (1827) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing rule that corporate
directors can be distinguished from corporation and insulated from liability as "a talisman by whose magic
powers the whole fabric which law has erected respecting corporations is atonce dissolved"); Sims Leffe v.
Irvine, 3 U.S. 425, 454 (1799) ("[T]here is no magic in the description of a patent").
10. See generally OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW CULTURE AND RITUAL:

DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-

CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1181
(2005); Suzanne Last Stone, Rabbinic Legal Magic: A New Look At Honi's Circle as the Construction of
Law's Space, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97 (2005).

11. The indeterminacy of legal analysis is, of course, a central tenet of critical legal studies. See generally
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) (1997); Mark Tushnet, Survey Article:
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therefore be irrational and false or superficial and unconnected to law's social
effects. Legal magic may have a fruitful role to play in a legal system we
conceive as helping to create the social world.
My thesis is that the Realists were right that law works like magic but wrong
about how magic works. The Realists' understanding of the magic they
identified in legal forms and doctrines was foreclosed by their adoption of the
Victorian anthropological definition of magic as a kind of false science.
Modem field anthropologists, however, revised that view observing that magic
and ritual are not necessarily in tension with reason. Indeed, much of the work
of twentieth-century anthropology, across a wide theoretical spectrum, reenvisions magic and ritual outside the Victorian identification of magic and
primitive irrationality. Early functionalist and structuralist theories; "structuralfunctionalist" approaches that stress the social work of ritual; and cultural
analyses that interpret magic and ritual in terms of performance, language, and
symbol all reject the necessary opposition of ritual magic and reason. Viewing
law as magic from these perspectives produces two important challenges to the
Realist view. First, it allows us to see that magic and ritual aspects of
adjudication do not necessarily conflict with rational legal decision-making.
Second, it suggests some ways that the legal magic the Realists criticized might
actually enhance law's legitimacy and effectiveness.
Following the Realists, however, many legal theorists today view the ideal
of law as instrumental: policy decisions made by intelligent, conscientious
individuals who combine clear-eyed empirical assessments with thoughtful
value judgments to produce sensible and just social regulation. 2 In that
paradigm, any aspects of adjudication that smack of ritual magic appear corrupt
and dysfunctional. But in the model of law as socially constitutive-shaped in
part by the Realists' own criticism of law's persistent failure to dispense social
justice-law interacts with society in much more pervasive and complex
institutional ways. In this view, law constitutes and transforms social meaning
by helping to create and recreate the social situations at issue in adjudication.
Ritual magic is a long-recognized mechanism of such transformations.
In law, as in ritual magic, transforming the meaning of a set of social
circumstances can happen through common formal and performative
techniques that may look like mere distractions or ways to disguise what is
really going on. In fact, some functions of law in our society may depend on

CriticalLegal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99 (2005). It is also central to
the approach of economic pragmatists. See generally Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL
L. REv. 761 (2006) (reviewing LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON:

THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL

ARGUMENT (2005)). Judge Posner argues that categorical doctrinal reasoning "is a surface phenomenon," a
form of judicial rhetoric that "tends to obscure the policy grounds that determine the outcome of a case."
POSNER, supra, at 765.
12. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
(2006).
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these techniques, not because they confer logical-rational correctness or

predictability, but because they may contribute to judicial impartiality and
because they may provide a mechanism through which official legal decisions
take on some of the affective power of lived experience and so generate the

personal and collective commitment that leads to social transformation.
Particularly as the social influence of extralegal religious and community
norms becomes more evident and opposed to judicial articulations of the
secular "rule of law," it seems important to consider aspects of adjudication

3
that may elicit similar forms of social commitment.'

The "magic" that I mean to reference as my point of anthropological

comparison is a broad category. Magic, in this sense, encompasses practices in
diverse cultures that aim to achieve some kind of transformative effect through
a combination of physical and verbal techniques that are distinct from ordinary
technical interventions. These practices have sometimes been categorized
separately as magic, sorcery, and shamanism; but, like the Realists, I shall
sweep them all under the heading of "magic., 14 I will also consider some ritual
practices aimed at producing transformations that even Realist skeptics might
be prepared to recognize as in some sense real, such as initiation rites. Not all
"ritual" is "magic," and perhaps not all magic requires ritual, but most of my
analysis will focus on the intersection of these two categories. I explore
practices in other settings that are understood to transform the meaning of a set
of circumstances through a combination of performative, formal, metaphoric,
and temporal techniques in order to illuminate the use of similar techniques in
adjudication. For instance, I argue that in some specific ways, adjudication
resembles the rites conducted by Trobriand magicians to protect the yam

13. In another time of historic conflict between social beliefs and constitutional legal order, legal historian
Calvin Woodard similarly pondered the social effects of what he called the "secularization" of law through our
broad adoption of the Realists' critique. See generally Calvin Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism- An
HistoricalPerspective,54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968).
14. These terms have had various and shifting meanings in anthropological usage over the past century
and a half. Some scholars use them in taxonomic fashion to differentiate specific practices. See E.E. EVANSPRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, ORACLES, AND MAGIC AMONG THE AZANDE 176 (abridged ed., Clarendon 1976)
(1937) [hereinafter EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT] ("Witchcraft, oracles, and magic are like three sides to a
triangle. Oracles and magic are two different ways of combating witchcraft ....The use of magic for socially
approved ends, such as combating witchcraft, is sharply distinguished by Azande from its evil and anti-social
use in sorcery"); BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC 72-76 (Routledge 1961)
(1922) [hereinafter MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS] (describing differentially sorcerers and witches against the
background of general magic among the Trobriand Islanders). More recently, some scholars have suggested
that these terms are analytically empty because they create false categories imposed by Western scholars on
other cultures' "intellectual universes." D.F. Pocock, Forwardto MARCEL MAUSS, A GENERAL THEORY OF
MAGIC 8-9 (Robert Brain trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1972) (1950). As Bruce Kapferer remarks, terms
like "sorcery" and "magic" are burdened by nineteenth century negative prejudices of anthropological
discourse in which they were originally defined and with recent "valorization[s]" by post-modem critics and
are further problematic because they group together highly diverse practices. BRUCE KAPFERER, THE FEAST OF
THE SORCERER: PRACTICES OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND POWER 8-9 (1997) [hereinafter KAPFERER, FEAST OF THE
SORCERER].
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harvest from depletion.
Much of what I discuss as magic might also be analyzed as aspects of
religion. By speaking in terms of ritual magic I do not mean to endorse a clear
objective distinction between the practices or concepts of magic and religion.
Indeed, the breakdown of such an imagined boundary is part of the modem
anthropological discourse I embrace here. 16 By sticking with the label of
magic, I mean to signal that I am considering aspects of legal practice that
when recognized have generally been vilified as irrational and out of place in
legitimate democratic institutions. I also mean to stress my debt to the Realist
thinkers who first systematically critiqued legal magic.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the techniques that
adjudication and ritual magic have in common. Both law and magic enact
performances to transform reality. In law, those performances are trials,
hearings, arguments, rulings-all the public processes of adjudication. These
legal and magical rituals are characterized by a rigidly formal structure that
diverges from everyday behavior and language and by a transgressive approach
The efficacy of both magic spells and judicial
to historical time.
determinations partakes of the "performative" force of language, so that when
judges and sorcerers speak in the proper ritual contexts, the act of saying it does
both law and magic make use of metaphors to accomplish
make it so.' 7 And
18
transformations.
In Parts II and III, I show how the Realist critique of adjudication parallels
the Victorian anthropological view of magic and offer an alternative approach
culled from twentieth-century anthropology. The Victorian scholars who
developed the academic discipline of anthropology saw magic as false
science. 19 But there are other ways to conceptualize magic. Bronislaw
Malinowski, for instance, observed that among the Trobriand Islanders he
studied, magic worked alongside the accurate empirical observations and
technical capacity needed to build seaworthy canoes and cultivate productive

15. 1 do not intend to include in my comparative category the sort of entertainments presented on
Broadway, Las Vegas, or at children's birthday parties that are unambiguously understood to be illusions even
by the youngest audience members and certainly by the magicians. There may well be things to be learned
from a comparison of legal proceedings and Western stage magic. See generally LAW AND MAGIC: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (Christine Corcos ed., 2008). In this article, however, I focus on practices that are in
their own contexts regarded as effectively restorative or transformative even if they are also understood to rely
partly on illusion.
16.

See MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND

TABOO 18-29 (Taylor & Francis 2001) (1966) [hereinafter DOUGLAS, PURITY]; STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH,
MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY 1-8 (1990) [hereinafter TAMBIAH, MAGIC].

17. J.L. AUSTIN, How TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 7-8 (2d ed. 1975). J.L. Austin coined the term
"performative" to designate utterances that simply by being spoken accomplish an act of some sort. Id. at 4-6.
18. Compare Cohen, supra note 4, at 812, (criticizing "the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional
jurisprudence"), with MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 443-52 (observing use of metaphor in spells
employed in Trobriand Magic).
19. See EDWARD B. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE 112-15 (1889).
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gardens.20 The magic Trobrianders practiced over their canoes and crops,
therefore, was something other than a misguided attempt to interfere with
natural processes. 2 1 Trobriand magic was "a special department; ... a specific22
power, essentially human, autonomous and independent in its action."
Malinowski observed that magic had an organizing and regulating effect on
activities, like gardening and Kula voyaging, that were central to the Trobriand
economy. Thus, among other early field anthropologists, he opened up the
possibility that instead of 23ineffective science, magic might be an effective
social and cultural practice.
Part IV reconsiders legal magic through this alternative theoretical lens.
First, I theorize an authentic ritual-magic mode of legal practice. Then, I
propose three potential ways to re-conceptualize legal magic's role in
adjudication: (1) as a way to imbue official articulations of legal norms and
decisions with the affective moral force of lived experience, (2) as an
institutional practice that may enhance judicial impartiality, and (3) as a method
for symbolically reversing injuries.
In this light, legal magic may contribute to a theory of how legal practices
influence culture. Law is not just regulatory. Legal institutions not only
sanction and constrain our world, they also generate and transform it. As
Robert Cover expressed, law and culture together constantly create and recreate
"nomos"-a normative universe of legal meaning-beyond state-enforced legal
power.24 This insight is not confined to highfalutin legal theorists. The "and"
in the phrase "law and order" reflects our common understanding that there is
more to law than maintaining social order. But how does law do the subtle
work of cultural transformation? A well-developed body of scholarship
analyzes law's absorption of social norms and production of social meaning
through the narrative structure of case law. 25 Outside of narrative theory,
however, consideration of law as a socially constituting force mostly takes
place at a high level of abstraction.26 In this conceptual vagueness, law's
20. See MALNowsKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 420, 427. "The natives realize quite well that the
speed and buoyancy of a canoe are due to the knowledge and work of the constructor," he explained, "they are

well acquainted with the properties of good material and of good craftsmanship." Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Nomos].
25.

MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 427.
MALINowsm, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 427.
See TAMBIAH, MAGIC, supra note 16, at 42-64.
Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 4-10 (1983)

[hereinafter Cover,

See generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 194-216 (2000);

Milner S. Ball, Just Stories, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. Lrr. 37 (2000); James Boyd White, Constructing a
Constitution: "OriginalIntention" in the Slave Cases,47 MD. L. REv. 239 (1987).
Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of
26. See Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between:
Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 597, 600 (1994) (contending both critical and classical legal
scholarship operate "in the realm of grand and generalized assumptions without precise consideration of how
ideas or fragments of ideas migrate across the boundary that, we believe, distinguishes law from everyday
life"); cf LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY Xiii
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constitutive functions pale beside the interpretive and enforcing modes that are
explored in precise terms from a variety of theoretical perspectives. 27 Using
anthropological theories of magic, I consider how legal magic may help shape
social reality in ways that are neither wholly discursive nor wholly coercive.
II.

PRACTICAL SIMILARITIES OF LAW AND MAGIC

Rattan here now, rattanhere ever, 0 rattan
from the north-east!
Come, anchor thyself in the north-east.
... I shallfasten in the north-east.
My bottom is as a binabina stone, as the
old dust, as the blackened powder ....
My yam-house is anchored; my yam-house is as the immovable rock...
28
Trobriand spell

I want to begin my reanalysis of legal magic by setting forth some practical
ways in which adjudication resembles ritual magic. In this endeavor, I am
indebted to the Realist critique of legal magic, which was often quite concrete.
For instance, Felix Cohen and Jerome Frank did not merely complain that
judges used "magic words" in a general sense. They focused on particular
aspects of judicial language-metaphor and the use of words to "produce an
action and not to describe one"-that are also found in magic. 29 The Realists,
however, made no attempt to systematically compare the techniques of law and
magic, nor did they explicitly identify techniques of legal magic as such or
discuss how those techniques cut across the different aspects of adjudicationdoctrinal reasoning, precedential deference, and procedural formality-that
they criticized as magical.
Aided by the Realist critiques and analyses of magic and ritual in other
cultural contexts, I have identified five techniques of legal magic: enacting
performance, heightened formality, performativity, temporal play, and
(1989) (arguing anthropologists tend to treat formal legal proceedings as sui generis and thus uninteresting or
opaque in terms of law/culture boundary). Legal scholars, meanwhile, avoid explicating sociolegal interactions
because they regard them as irrelevant to "the course of actual legal decisionmaking" or fear reducing law to an
economic, political, or psychological epiphenomenon. Id.
27. There are exceptions that provide excellent concrete analysis of law's constructive techniques. See
generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE O1 LAW 95 (1998) [hereinafter EWICK &
SILBEY, COMMON PLACE]; Donald R. Korobkin, Bankruptcy, Law, Ritual And Performance, 103 COLUM. L.

REv. 2124 (2003); Steven L. Winter, TranscendentalNonsense and the Stakes, Metaphoric Reasoning and the
Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1988).
28. 1 BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS AND THEIR MAGIC 221 (1965) [hereinafter
MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS I].
29. FRANK, supra note 7, at 85 (quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 308 (11 th ed. 1911) (discussing
"Magic").
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transformative analogy. Below, I consider the role of each technique, first in
comparing a Supreme Court case to a Trobriand harvest rite, and then in greater
detail in a variety of adjudicative contexts. My goal in this article, however, is
not to exhaustively describe the role of each of these techniques in
adjudication. I offer this categorical breakdown at the outset to identify
concrete practices behind the general intuition that there is something magical
about adjudication and to establish that the similarities between law and magic
do not dissolve upon closer study.
All five techniques of legal magic are exemplified in the similarities between
the Trobriand spell quoted at the top of this section, employed to protect the
30
village yam harvest, and the Supreme Court decision in Munn v. Illinois,
holding that privately owned granaries are public warehouses subject to state
regulation. 31 Both the spell and the decision require enacting performances to
transform reality. To protect a Trobriand yanhouse against depletion, the
magician must appear in person to perform the spell and the rite's prescribed
actions. Similarly, transforming a Chicago granary into a "public warehouse,"
in order to protect the stores from exorbitant storage fees, requires a public
appearance where justices and others perform set gestures and utter prescribed
words. Both of these performances are rigidly formalized in ways that set them
apart from ordinary actions and speech. Among other things, they are
extraordinarily susceptible to formal limits on time and place. Unless the
magician invokes the yamhouse spell at dawn inside the empty storehouse, his
words accomplish no protective effect. The transformation of the granary can
only take place if the justices of the Court deliver their decision within the
walls of the Supreme Court building. If instead the justices told their neighbors
that the granary is a public warehouse, or even said so in the public press, their
words would not change the status of the building or the grain inside.
Within the appropriate spatial and temporal contexts, however, the magic
spell and the judicial opinion exhibit an unusually strong performative force.
When the magician completes his yamhouse rite, the storehouse is secure. The
rite itself brings about that security. Both the yarnhouse spell and the majority
opinion in Munn are semantically structured as descriptions of external reality;
but it is a reality that is aimed for, merely desired, until the words effectuate it.
The yamhouse "is as a binabina stone"; the grain elevator is "in the very
gateway of [public] commerce." Like the Trobriand spell, the Munn opinion
does not merely describe or predict a change in the building's status, it
conduces it. Through association to the dense volcanic (binabina)rock, the
yamhouse becomes heavy and "anchored," just as through association to other
publicly regulated enterprises, the grain warehouse becomes "public." 32 Of

30. 94 U.S. 113(1876).
31. Id. (rejecting due process challenge toprice ceilings for privately held granaries).
32. Id. at 127-32.
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course, practical actions follow so that the villagers fill up the yamhouse and
refrain from partaking of its stores while government agents monitor Munn's
storage charges. Only the rite or adjudication itself, however, can trigger these
actions, at least to the extent that a culture recognizes the power of magic or the
rule of law.
In effecting their performative outcomes, both the Trobriand magician and
the Munn Court pair the constricted real-time limits of their performances with
a transgressive approach to historical time. The Trobriand spell invokes long
dead ancestors. 33 Likewise, the justices in Munn appropriate precedential
ancestors' words and explicitly name those ancestors in order to increase the
weight of their own legal words.
Finally, both the yarnhouse spell and the Munn decision transform through
analogy. The Trobriand magician uses the darkness and weight of the volcanic
binabina stone and the resilience of the rattan cane, substances traditionally
invoked in other magic rites to conduce endurance and stability. Justice Waite,
writing for the Munn majority, invokes the qualities of previously designated
"public" businesses and transfers them to Munn's warehouse.
Unlike
metaphors in other contexts, these metaphorical associations have a kind of
creative power. They transform through analogy. "Every bushel of grain for
its passage," says the Munn majority, "'pays a toll, which is a common charge,'
and therefore, according to Lord Hale, every such warehouseman 'ought to be
under public regulation, viz., that he ...take but reasonable toll."' 34 When the
majority brings the warehouse within the judicial ancestor's description of
"public" transportation, the analogical transformation is complete.
Thus, all five techniques of legal magic work together in Munn to generate
the transformative effect of that decision. Each of these five techniques can
also be considered independently in different adjudicative contexts.
A. EnactingPerformance
Though much in law depends on written words-indeed "papers" might
fairly be called a legal fetish-live ritual performance remains central to
adjudication as legal transformations require it. 35 For instance, a person's
criminal act, arrest, or full confession does not make her a felon. To become a
33. Trobriand garden magic spells are largely attributed to an ancestral hero, Tudava. MALINOWSKI,
CORAL GARDENS 1, supra note 28, at 7. "The first garden magician received the spells from Tudava himself
and the formulae are still handed down in the mother-line." Id. Tudava's name appears in a spell from a
second anchoring rite that follows the one quoted here. Id. at 223.
34. Munn, 94 U.S. at 132.
35. This aspect of law has been generally underexamined in a world of legal scholarship that focuses on
textual interpretation and abstract pnnciples. There, however, are some exceptions. See generally OSCAR
CHASE, LAW, CULTURE AND RITUAL:

DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005); MILNER S.

BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW:

Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Motions
(1995).

A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS (1981);

The Embodiment of Law in Gesture, 6 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51
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felon, a person must undergo a particular ceremony called a conviction that can
only take place through a live, real-time enactment. The majority of those
transformed from citizen to convict now bypass the elaborate performance of a
trial. But even conviction through plea agreements requires at least two
ceremonies-the allocution and the sentencing-both of which require the
accused, a judge, and at least one attorney for "the people." Often, subsequent
appellate and post-conviction rituals take place involving even more judges and
attorneys. Indeed, the fact that our criminal justice system remains stubbornly
committed to live public performance, despite the shift from adversarial trials
to plea bargaining, is one example of the primacy of real-time enactment in
adjudication.
Against the general trend away from live performance in other areas where
important social decisions are made, adjudication's reliance on these rites
becomes all the more striking. Today, many governmental functions seem to
rely on more abstract, informal, and intangible methods of governance. For
instance, various sorts of licensing, application, and registration processeseven voting-can now be accomplished by phone, mail, or computer. Most
people rarely see a bank employee in person anymore. The exchange of very
large sums of money and significant property routinely takes place
electronically. Internet college courses abound. Nevertheless, adjudication

remains live, real-time, and formal.
There is a sense that courtroom performance persists not merely as a matter
of tradition and ceremony but rather because without ritual, there could be no
adjudication. 36 Consider that even criminal defendants who abscond during
trial cannot be convicted without the completion of the trial through the unusual
device of trial in absentia, in which all the other legal actors involved perform

their roles to completion. 37 Likewise, a civil defendant cannot be held liable or
36. The singularity of legal rituals is further emphasized by the way many courts continue to shrink from
virtual representations. Across the country, television and even still cameras are still locked out of federal
courts that insist on the quaint use of sketch artists. At the United States Supreme Court, visitors are not
permitted to take notes, although one can now hear the audio recordings of Supreme Court arguments online.
When I tried to obtain a tape of an argument I made in the Eleventh Circuit, however, I was informed by the
court clerk that the recording was intended for the exclusive use of the judges and that no one else, including
the attorneys whose words were on the tape, could obtain a copy. Much governmental work is done behind
closed doors, where the press and general public are forbidden to watch. Adjudication, however, is a public
ritual. The unwillingness of the key participants to allow secondary representations thus is not a matter of
secrecy. It suggests both that there is something irreducible about the live ritual and that its procedures might
be disrupted by reproduction.
37. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43. Rule 43 requires a defendant's physical presence at the arraignment, at the
time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and
at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by the rule. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a). "The further
progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be
considered to have waived the right to be present when a defendant, is voluntarily absent after the trial has
begun." FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c). At common law, it was generally held that no valid felony conviction could
be obtained without the defendant's presence. In 1912, the U.S. Supreme Court authorized the limited
exception codified in Rule 43. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912). The Court explained that if a
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deprived of property until the ceremony of adjudication is completed with all
38
the necessary actors performing all the essential procedures.
Though legal procedure has been drastically streamlined throughout the last
century, the emphasis seems to have been mainly on shortening and simplifying
written pleadings, jettisoning complicated forms, and replacing them with more
direct communication. Remarkably, face time in courts seems to have been
only minimally affected. 39 Even with the increase in caseloads, trial courts still
conduct trials pretty much as they always did. True, some appellate courts now
hear arguments in only a minority of cases; but given their heavier caseloads,
the time these courts sit to hear argument may actually have increased. 40 All in
all, it seems remarkable that despite decreased live interaction in so many other
professional settings-e.g., between doctors and their patients, bankers and
their customers-lawyers, and particularly courts, have maintained live
performances as the central and definitive aspect of their craft.
B. Heightened Formalityand the Creationof Ritual Time and Space
Rigid adherence to idiosyncratic and intricate procedural forms is a hallmark
of magic, which, as Annette Weiner puts it, proceeds through "a poetics that
cannot be altered." 41 Legal procedure is likewise strictly formal. Moreover,
the particulars of magical and legal forms contain certain points of
resemblance, specifically in the way both create language sequences that can be
referenced across time and that trigger complex narrative associations.
Legal and magic rituals both exhibit extraordinary sensitivity to time and
place. In the judicial process, it matters enormously when and where an
argument is made or a fact revealed. In most other important governmental and
private decision making neither the time nor the location of an expressed idea
matters much at all. There is a need to get the information to the decisionmakers and a practical need for a decision at some point. But otherwise, it does
not matter whether an idea is expressed in June rather than January or in a
defendant voluntarily chooses to leave his trial in progress, the absence "operates as a waiver of his right to be
present, and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in like manner and with like effect as ifhe were
present." Id. (emphasis added). More recently, the Court struck down a conviction in absentia as invalid
because the defendant absconded before trial began, holding that under those circumstances Rule 43 prohibits
conviction without the defendant's actual presence. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993).
38. 1 am reminded of my nephew, Reuben, whose grandparents had been part of his first five birthday
celebrations. Having moved across the country dunng his sixth year, he was told that Grandma and Grandpa
would not be attending his upcoming birthday party. This was out of the question, he explained, because
without them, he could not "get six."
39. The United States Supreme Court is an odd exception where over the past couple of decades, the
caseload has decreased drastically.
40. William Glaberson, Caseload Forcing Two-Level System for U.S. Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
1999 at Al.
41. Annette B. Weiner, From Words to Objects to Magic: "Hard Words" and the Boundaries of Social
Interaction, in DANGEROUS WORDS: LANGUAGE AND POLITICS INTHE PACIFIC 181 (Donald Lawrence Brenneis
& Fred R. Myers eds., 1984).
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coffee shop rather than an official government building.
In adjudication,
however, as in magic, such contextual distinctions make the difference between
success or failure. Strict procedural rules about waiver, exhaustion, and
preservation mean that unless lawyers present their arguments and facts at
exactly the time and place determined by the legal rules, they will be
ineffective, regardless of the substance.
C. Performativity
The characteristic power of legal and magical words to do things, as well as
to express them, is what ordinary language philosophers call "performative"
speech.43 In the paradigmatic case of performative utterances, no physical or
technical activity is needed; the words do the work. 4 While performatives
exist in everyday speech, this type of utterance, and a focus on the performative
aspect of language in general, is characteristic of both legal and magical
transactions. When a Trobriand magician says "[i]t shall be anchored," he is
not just talking about the yamhouse; he is doing something with words.
Likewise, when a judge says "so ordered," her words themselves perform the
act.45
The performative power of language is extraordinarily sensitive to factors
outside the speaker's conscious intention. For example, a magician's spell will
be ineffective if she mispronounces a word, forgets to perform a gesture that is
part of the associated rite, or says the words at the wrong time or place.
Conversely, if a magician accurately pronounces the spell at the appropriate
time and place, with the prescribed gestures, and in the proper condition, the
spell becomes effective regardless of whether she intended to make it operative.
Once activated, magic remains in effect until the proper countermagic is
worked, even if the magician has second thoughts.
Performative words are similarly sensitive to surrounding circumstances in
the legal arena. If the conditions are not properly set, the words of a judge lose
their performative power. In one instance, a magistrate's attempted exercise of
his contempt power was found to be invalid because it took place in a holding

42. Legislative process also proceeds to some extent by ritual, but less so. The formal heanng process
memorialized in a legislative record has a unique epistemological status in subsequent adjudication, but during
the drafting of statutes, legislators remain free to draw upon any sources of information at any time they
choose, within practical limits.
43. See AUSTIN, supra note 17, at 4-7.
44. AUSTIN, supra note 17, at 6-7.
45. MIALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS I, supra note 28, at224. As suggested by the examples given above,
performative language in law and magic tends to concentrate on a particular kind of verbal act-namely, the
transformation of some person or object from one status or identity to another. Other classic examples are
when the jury foreperson announces "we find the defendant guilty," transforming a citizen into a convict, and
when a magician casts a charm or spell on an object or person with words like, "I charm thy inside of canoe."
See MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 440.
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cell that "connotes a jail rather than a court."46 If the conditions are right,
however, judicial words take effect whether or not the judge who uttered them
meant them to do so. This is the problem satirized in the tale of the sorcerer's
apprentice, famously rendered in the Disney cartoon, in which the unpracticed
initiate "turns on" the wizard's magic with a spell he has overheard in order to
get supernatural assistance with his chores, but then realizes he does not know
how to turn it off. The magic he has invoked has set the mops and buckets in
motion, and on they will march until the spell is broken, turning the newly
washed floor to watery chaos.
The unruly potential power of judicial words was brought home to me by a
story related by a trial judge. One day in court, a lawyer was not responding to
the judge's instruction to cease a line of questioning during cross-examination.
The judge sustained numerous objections by the opposing attorney to no avail.
After admonishing the questioning lawyer to move on to other topics, still to no
avail, the judge remarked, mildly as he remembered it, "You're in contempt,
you know." Now, the judge meant this statement descriptively. As he
explained it, he meant to say that the lawyer's deliberate refusal to follow the
judge's repeated instruction was the kind of behavior that could support the
judge's holding him in contempt of court if the judge chose to do so. How the
lawyer understood the judge's words at the time, I do not know. In any case,
he ceased his objectionable questions and the trial proceeded. After court had
adjourned for the day, the court reporter came up to the judge and asked him if
he had held the lawyer in contempt. The judge replied that he had not and
thought no more about it.
It was a long trial that went on for some time after this incident and finally
concluded. Years later, the judge was having lunch with one of the other
attorneys who had tried the case. They were reminiscing about the trial, and
discussing some other contretemps, when the judge's lunch companion
suddenly said, "Oh, yes, that was the day you held Lawyer X in contempt and
then had it taken out of the record." The judge, flabbergasted, protested that he
had done no such thing. "Oh yes you did," said the lawyer, "You said he was
in contempt. We all heard it and we looked for it in the record later, but it was
not there."
Thinking back, the judge now realized what must have happened. After
speaking with him that evening, the court reporter, thinking he was doing the
judge a favor by conforming the record to the judge's intention omitted the
words "you're in contempt" from the day's transcript. The judge had meant his
statement only in a denotative, or, as Austin calls it, "constative," sense. 47 He
had meant to say that he believed the lawyer's conduct was bad enough to
warrant holding him in contempt and perhaps to warn him that such a holding

46. Thompson v. Stahl, 346 F. Supp. 401, 404 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
47. AUSTIN, supra note 17, at 3.
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might follow if he did not stop what he was doing. The lawyers for the other
side, however, took it as a performative utterance. To them the judge's words
had invoked his official power to hold the offending lawyer in contempt. In so
doing, he had enacted a kind of change in the lawyer's status and his
relationship to the court from which all kinds of other consequences would
necessarily flow and which would require other official action to reverse.
When none of those consequences were forthcoming, they checked the official
record and were surprised to find that the "magic words" the judge had uttered
had disappeared. The court reporter had apparently sensed an ambiguity.
Being unsure whether the judge had meant to cause the transformation his
words seemed to invoke, he had inquired, and upon finding that the judge had
not, had taken it upon himself to remove the effective words from the trial
record.
There are two interesting things here. First, there is the illustration of the
performative aspect of judicial language. That is, as the lawyers understood it,
by saying, "You're in contempt," the judge was not just saying something, he
was doing something. His words transformed the legal and social reality. But
even more interesting, I think, is the fact that faced with a conflict between the
judge's intent and the conventional effect of the judge's words in context, the
court reporter thought it wise to get rid of the words altogether. It is, after all, a
court reporter's job to record faithfully every word spoken during a trial.
Deleting something the reporter knew the judge said was an extraordinary step.
Curiously, it could indicate that the reporter had either an unusually informal
view of court proceedings or a highly developed sense of the conventional
power of those proceedings verging on ritual magic. Taking the informal view,
the reporter may have felt that the only thing that really mattered was what the
judge personally intended at the time that he said, "You're in contempt." Or,
even more extreme, the reporter may have thought that although the judge had
originally meant to hold the lawyer in contempt at the time he made his
declaration, he had apparently rethought the matter, so there was no point in
leaving the original utterance in the record because the judge no longer
intended to enforce it.
But notice that with this last suggestion, a bit of the magical perspective has
begun to creep back into the reporter's choice. For if the words really had no
force without the judge's intent behind them, then why bother to delete them?
Well, you might say, in order to get rid of a needless ambiguity. Perhaps, but
remember that much of what is said in court every day leads to ambiguities that
will later elicit hours and pages of conflicting interpretations by lawyers. It is
certainly not the reporter's job to forestall those arguments by deleting
ambiguous statements. No, I cannot help but think that by striking that
sentence from the record, whether consciously or not, the reporter was
acknowledging the extraordinary conventional power of the judge's words. He
was acting as if the words themselves, uttered in the appropriate formal context,
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had the power to disrupt reality, even if the person who spoke them meant no
such thing. It, therefore, was better to take the extraordinary step of removing
those dangerous words from the trial record. The very existence of the words
in the record created a significant enough possibility of unwanted results that
the reporter thought it prudent to excise them.
Now, again, you may say that the reporter was just trying, perhaps wrongheadedly, to conform the record to what the judge had meant to say and do, and
did not have any idea about performative, let alone magic, words. Moreover, if
he had left the words in the transcript and the other lawyers had pointed them
out, the judge could have corrected the matter himself by explaining on the
record that he had not intended the words to have the effect of a ruling. But
notice again the irreducible performative effect of the words and its similarity
to a magic spell. For to actually undo the words' potential legal effect, the
judge would have to repudiate them on the record, in open court, before both
parties or their representatives-that is, in the proper ritual context. To
neutralize them, he would have to invoke an equal degree of the conventional
power that is only available to him during a certain kind of publicly performed
ritual. The judge could privately tell every one of the parties that he had not
meant the words to have the effect of a contempt citation, and he could publish
his true intentions in the next day's newspaper, but such explanations would
not reliably cancel the performative legal effect of the words uttered in their
ritual context. In this sense, at least, the court reporter's action was reasonable,
if improper.
D. TemporalPlay
Both magic and law obsessively trace lineages of power, and in so doing
subdue the ordinary sense of temporal order. Shamans converse with ancestors
in their ritual search for cures, and judges seek guidance from men who sat on
their court a hundred or more years ago: options generally unavailable to
48
ordinary people making decisions. Precedent makes judges time travelers.
In spells and judicial decisions, there are strict rules about which lines of
authority count.
Spells contain obligatory and formalized references to
ancestors and, particularly, previous owners of the spell, which mirror the
idiosyncratic adjudicative practice of authorizing legal decisions by citing

48. Moreover, the magician's forebears remain accessible and active in the ongoing use of their spells,
much as judges from long ago continue to exercise power over the present through their precedential opinions.
In the chanting of spells, words and objects that absorb them must become powerful enough to
activate a range of agents ... in the physical environment; e.g., birds animals, plants, insects, and
even the deceased former owners of the spells (ancestors), all of whom exist outside the daily life of
social interaction.
Weiner, supra note 41, at 182.
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binding precedent. 49 Some local forms of magic can be performed only by
someone descended from the original ancestor who handed down the rites.
"[T]he magic is given by one man to another, as a rule by the father to his son
or by the maternal kinsman." 50 It is not simply a matter of invoking traditional
authority or relying on conventional wisdom. Nor is it a question of adopting
the reasoning of someone considered to be particularly wise or trustworthy. It
would be helpful if the nineteenth-century judge quoted had a reputation as a
sound thinker, but in legal terms, it matters far more that he sat on the same or a
higher court as the judge who invokes his words.
The doctrine of judicial precedent is generally thought of as a mechanism for
constraining judges' discretion; but by analogy to magical practices, we can see
the ritual invocation of precedent as a symbol and source of judicial power.
Although precedent changes and develops over time, judges reach back to
appropriate the authority of their predecessors for current legal doctrine.
Likewise, "each spell shows unmistakable signs of being a collection of
linguistic additions from different epochs." Apparently, like case law, magic
spells contain both archaic language and contemporary phrases added in more
recent usage. Thus, like a common-law rule, "a spell is constantly being
remoulded as it passes through the chain of magicians, each probably leaving
his mark, however small, upon it." Nevertheless, such spells-and common
law-are regarded as timeless and authorized by the ancestors who originated
them.51
Adjudication's combination of this transgressive time transcendence with
rigidly constrained time limits is characteristic of the "liminal" quality of
rituals. Precedents may be timeless, but if the party has rested, if the brief has
been filed, if the red light on the lectern is on, then time is up. Generally, even
if some important new evidence arises, it is considered "out of time." Magic
rituals are likewise strictly scheduled, with rigid orders of actions that must be
accomplished at particular times and in a particular sequence to achieve the
desired effects. Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey suggest that "legality's
timeless, transcendent status as something distant and removed from everyday
life is achieved not by representing it as intangible, but by associating it with
specific material phenomena: buildings, courtrooms, benches, pews, tables,
files, codes and prison cells. ' 52 The hyper-materialized space and sharp
temporal limits on the one hand, and the sense of escape from ordinary spacetime on the other, emphasize the separation of the ritual from ordinary life.
49. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1165-69 (9th Cir. 2001) (regarding the development of
common law precedential practice). Arguably, the concept of precedent adds weight to judges' language as
"speech acts." See Jessie Allen, Just Words: No-Citation Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 29 VT. L.
REV. 555, 604-10 (2005).
50. See MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 400.
51. See MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 428-29.
52. EwICK& SILBEY, COMMON PLACE, supra note 27, at 95.
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E. TransformativeAnalogy
Anthropologists describe the language of magic as quintessentially
metaphorical, imparting qualities observed in one context or object to another.
As Michelle Rosaldo explains, magic creates its transformative effects by a
kind of categorization. Spells invoke images from a diverse array of objects
and experiences. Then, "these images, in turn, are regrouped and organized in
terms of a small set of culturally significant and contextually desirable
themes." 53 Is that not also an apt description of the way in which doctrinal
reasoning functions in law?
In both legal and magical analogies, the diversity of the source objects
contributes to the power of the eventual association. It is as though the greater
the distance between the objects likened to one another, the more adhesive
force their eventual association carries. Like a sort of poetic law of kinetic
energy, the farther apart the assimilated objects, the more force their connection
generates, as though their relationship is strengthened by having overcome the
gap between them. 54 The diversity of the objects and situations analogized
serves to emphasize the organizing power of the legal rule or magic rite that
draws them together.
Legal and magical metaphors often assimilate things from disparate realms.
In particular, metaphor is used to connect human ideals and problems with
concrete physical experience. 55 For instance, magic assimilates the spatial
characteristic of variable length with longevity, so that a piece of twine or a line
in your palm may indicate whether you will live a long time. An indentation in
a person's skin and a ball of string are not obviously similar. Their association
relies on a pre-selected organizing principle that relates both to a central human
concern. The problem of mortality relates the palm line and the twine as both
are linear objects that vary in length and thus, may represent the hoped-for long
life; but the related objects differ in more ways than they are the same.
When objects are linked in either magical or legal associations, only the

53. Michelle Z. Rosaldo, It's All Uphill: The Creative Metaphors of Llongot Magical Spells, in
SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF LANGUAGE USE 178 (M. Sanches & D. Blount eds., 1975).
54. William Empson makes a similar point using a mechanical, as opposed to a spatial, image. He says
that the use of a metaphor generates a feeling of "resistance" to the assimilation of disparate referents in a
"false identity." Weiner, supra note 41, at 175 (quoting Empson). Processing the metaphor entails mentally
shifting "into a higher gear, because the machinery of interpretation must be brought into play," which then
generates "a feeling of richness about the possible interpretations of the word." Id.
55.
[E]ach magical system has necessarily set up categories of plants, minerals, animals, parts of the
body, dividing them into groups which do or do not have special or experimental properties. On the
other hand, each system has set about codifying the properties of abstract things-geometrical
figures, numbers, moral qualities, death, life, luck, etc. And the two sets of categories have been
made concordant.
MAUSS, supra note 14, at 77.
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qualities the magician or judge seeks to invoke are activated. Otherwise, the
world would present a vast, chaotic network of infinite correspondences and
disconnects. For instance, if clay is being used as a substance that will affect
some other object or person by association, the magician will concentrate only
on its coolness, weight, or color, depending on the effect he seeks to create or
amplify. 56 Malinowski describes the way a Trobriand canoe builder "takes his
adze (ligogu) and wraps some very light and thin herbs round the blade with a
piece of dried banana leaf, itself associated with the idea of lightness" before
beginning to cut the canoe body out of a log. 57 Lightness is a favorable
characteristic in a canoe, and it is a characteristic of the herbs and leaves used
to impart that quality. The plants, however, have other qualities that are not
desirable in a canoe, such as a tendency to break apart or tear easily. There are
also many ways in which a canoe and some leaves and herbs seem simply
unrelated. They are not objects that one would necessarily group together as
sharing any essential quality without knowing about the goal of the building
rite to lighten the canoe and the traditional symbolic association of the herbs
and leaves with lightness.
Similarly, whether the facts of different lawsuits are analogized or
distinguished depends on the legal analysis at stake. Even within a single case,
whether objects and circumstances are viewed as more alike than different
depends on the purpose of the comparison. When the victims of handgun
violence sued gun manufacturers for alleged negligence in allowing their guns
to fall into criminal hands, personal jurisdiction turned on whether different
defendants' guns were "fungible." 58 If they were, plaintiffs could proceed
without having to identify the manufacturer of each individual gun used in the
numerous shooting incidents that formed the basis of their suit. A magistrate
judge ruled that handguns were not sufficiently similar to be fungible for
jurisdictional purposes. The district judge, however, disagreed. He noted that
"the characteristic relevant to the matter at issue ... determines whether a
product is the same as and substitutable for another ... for purposes of
jurisdictional or substantive law." 59 For example, under this functional
approach, "for signaling New Year's Eve, a blast from an auto horn and one
from a saxophone may be equivalent as noise, but few would want to dance to
the former." 60 The judge explained that "[a]s a convenient killing instrument
almost any handgun serves its purpose," and the victims probably did not care
what sort of gun killed them. 61 But he acknowledged that other perspectives
were possible and might produce different results. "Whether public policy
56. MAuss, supra note 14, at 69.
57. MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 130.

58. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
59. Id.

60 Id. at 52.
61. Id.
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requires consideration of fungibility from the point of view of the
manufacturer, the lawful purchaser, the criminal, the victim, or some other
vantage, is a question62 intertwined with the nature of the tort laws and policy
controlling the case."

The source materials for legal and magical analogies are thus undetermined
but not limitless. At least some are recognizably more likely to be effective.
Using completely novel reference points would lack the conventional power of
invoking objects that are already embedded in previous incantations and
opinions. Both magical and legal metaphoric associations gain power from
their ability to reference chains of meaning that refer back to previous rituals
and their associated real-life situations. Malinowski comments that in
Trobriand spells, sometimes words are used that evoke narratives or pieces of
narratives. 63 The opening of a spell, he writes, consists of "pithy expressions,"
each of which stands "for its own cycle of ideas, for a sentence or even a whole
story." 64 He reports that the word "papapa," or "flutter," used in context means
to "let the canoe speed so that the pandanus leaves flutter." 65 Beyond even this
expanded meaning, Malinowski remarks that such words are highly evocative
of magical force for a practitioner, "in whose mind the whole context rises,
when he hears or repeats" the word.66 Compare, for example, the complicated
meaning and history that arises for lawyers and judges from the use of legal
terms of art such as "privity" or "equal protection." Like the magical terms
Malinowski explores, these words evoke for practitioners not only abstract
concepts of rights and duties, but also rich contextual narratives of the cases
and decisions through which those legal concepts have developed and the
previous conflicts in which they have been deployed.
In both magic and case law, the goal of analogy is to enhance certain aspects
of one thing by association with other things. So, for instance, Ilongot hunters
ritually exhort their dogs to "be like" a variety of real and abstract objects: 67a
harpoon arrow, the screeching of a hornbill bird, or a man meeting an enemy.
Each individual reference suggests a different characteristic the hunter seeks:
e.g., the arrow embodies swiftness and accuracy, and the man confronting an
adversary signifies implacability. According to Rosaldo, however, the diverse
source objects are united by their common association with some kind of
violence, and together, these associations build up an additional overall
reference to aggressive behavior that may make the objects collectively
effective as magical source materials and that is presumably desirable during

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Hamilton, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
See MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 433-35.
MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 434.
MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 434.
MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supranote 14, at 435.
Rosaldo, supra note 53, at 189.
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68

Now consider the crucial objects in a famous tort case-poison, faulty
scaffolding, a "large coffee urn"-each included through the abstract
characterization of "a thing of danger." 69

What makes these objects in

particular entrants to that category? Of course, it is their appearance in judicial
opinions deciding previous tort cases. Like the objects the Ilongot call out as
sources of hunting virtues for their dogs, they are linked through a previous

symbolic association with a unifying quality that is then expanded to
incorporate the target object. The coffee urn and faulty scaffolding are joined

in the famous legal decision that turned a Buick into "a thing of danger," in a
process that mirrors the way the harpoon arrow and hornbill
bird are united in
7
the spell that renders Ilongot hunting dogs aggressive.
III.

0

THE LEGAL REALISTS' VICTORIAN CRITIQUE OF LAW AS MAGIC

[M]agic is a spurious system of natural law as well as a fallacious guide of
conduct; it is a false science as well as an abortive art.
Sir James G. Frazer

71

[M]agic words and incantations are as fatal to our science as they are to
any other.
Hon. Benjamin N. Cardozo

72

I have said that the foregoing description of adjudication's affinities with

magic owes much to the Realists. In some of the best known Realist writings,
law is repeatedly likened to magic and ritual.73

Subsequent analyses of the

Realist critique, however, have generally ignored the references to legal magic,
perhaps dismissing them as a rhetorical device. Indeed, it has to be said that
the Realists themselves seem never to consider the potential importance of the

magical aspects of adjudication, though they describe them in some detail,
sometimes with references to serious ethnographic studies of magic and ritual
68. Rosaldo, supra note 53, at 189.
69. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Il1 N.E. 1050, 1052 (N.Y. 1916) (citing Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 88
N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909); Devlin v. Smith, 11 Abb. N. Cas. 322 (N.Y. 1882)).
70. Compare MacPherson, 11lN.E. at 1053, with supra note 67 and accompanying text.
71. JAMES G. FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH: A STUDY INMAGIC AND RELIGION 13 (abridged ed. 1996).
72. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 66 (1924).
73. The Realists were not the first to make these comparisons. American judges occasionally compared
legal arguments with which they disagreed to magic. For instance, a string of cases dealing with transfers of
land from the government to Western pioneers reject formal documentation as the sine qua non of legal
ownership, explaining, "There is no magic in the word 'patent,' or in the instrument which the word defines."
Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U.S. 312, 341 (1898); see also Burke v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669, 704 (1914);
supra note 8 (citing further examples).
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in other cultures. To uncover the potential of legal magic, it is worth
considering why the first systematic observers of that magic, and their
subsequent interpreters, have generally overlooked that potential.
For the Realists, judges' resort to "word magic" was proof that law's claim
to scientific reasoning was false because magic was definitionally defective
science. 74 Although the Realists rejected the equation of law and deductive
science, they assumed that legal decision-making should incorporate the
empirical approach and inductive reasoning of the social sciences they
championed. If magic is primitive or defective science, then magical law
equals bad science equals bad law.
The basic opposition of magic and reason has a long history in Western
thought, emerging clearly in the Enlightenment and arguably tracing back at
least as far as Aristotle. The specific theory of magic as a fallacious precursor
to modem scientific thought, however, belongs to the Victorian scholars who
first developed the academic discipline of anthropology.
A. VictorianMagic
The principles of association are excellent in themselves, and indeed
absolutely essential to the working of the human mind. Legitimately applied
they yield science; illegitimately applied they yield magic, the bastard sister of
science.
Sir James Frazer

75

Victorian anthropologists theorized magic as a primitive evolutionary phase,
both logically and chronologically prior to scientific reasoning. 76 In their
foundational work, the very definition of both primitiveness and irrationality
rested, in part, on the practice of magic ritual. As Sir James Frazer (18541938) explained, it is "a truism, almost a tautology, to say that all magic is
necessarily false and barren; for were it ever to become true and fruitful, it
would not [sic] longer be magic but science. ' 77 The concept of magic as a
misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the natural world was first and most
influentially articulated by Sir Edward Tylor (1832-1917). For Tylor, magic
was a distortion of analogical reasoning that mistook "an ideal for a real
connexion."'78 Tylor's ideas, elaborated and popularized by Frazer in his
74. See Green, supra note 6, at 1016 (criticizing "the part which sacred words, taboo words, magic words,
continue to play in our law"). Green suggests that a judge focusing on language, as opposed to policy and
justice, "can only do his science ill." Id. at 1019.
75. FRAZER, supra note 71, at 57.
76 See I EDWARD B. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE 112-15 (1889) [hereinafter TYLOR, PRIMITIVE
CULTURE].

77. FRAZER, supra note 71, at 57
78. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 116.
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classic Golden Bough, formed the lens through which many social scientists
viewed magic at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although the equation
of magic and "pseudo-science" has been resoundingly rejected by virtually
every field anthropologist who subsequently made a first-hand study of magical
practices, it was a dominant intellectual concept when the Realists were
writing, at least among English and American scholars.
Outside
anthropological
circles,
the
view
of
magic
as
false
science
remains
influential
79
to this day.
The heart of the Victorian understanding of magic as an evolutionary
precursor to science is magic's reliance on automatic ritual formulas rather than
empirical investigation to explain and affect the world. In the Victorian view,
magic's "fundamental conception is identical with that of modem science;
underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the order
and uniformity of nature." 80 What separates magic from science is magic's
modus operandi. Whereas science uses empirical observation and technical
intervention, magic uses symbolic words and gestures that ostensibly work
automatically, without real physical interventions.
As Frazer explained,
"Whatever doubts science may entertain as to the possibility of action at a
distance, magic has none ... ,,81
According to Tylor and Frazer, the basis of practitioners' belief in magic's
remote effects is a confusion of subjective and objective thought. Magic takes
subjective associations for real causal connections. Tylor theorized that belief
82
in magic rested on a mistaken application of the "Association of Ideas."
Magical thinking arose from the basic human thought process of association, "a
faculty," he explained, "which lies at the very foundation of human reason, but
in no small degree of human unreason also." 83 Magic was based on a primitive
assumption that the chain of mental associations from reality to imagination
runs in both directions. 84 "Man, as yet in a low intellectual condition, having
come to associate in thought those things which he found by experience to be
connected in fact, proceeded erroneously to invert this action," Tylor explained,

79. There was an important competing analysis of magic, ritual, and religion by a Victorian
contemporary, Emile Durkheim. Durkheim's theory of the primacy of social experience, as elaborated in his
work on religion, is a key progenitor of all the twentieth-century theories of magic that I discuss in Part Ill. See
generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (1965). Durkheim rejected the
evolutionary division between civilized religion and primitive magic.
His influence really cannot be
overstated. Another important source is Marcel Mauss, whose work on magic was also original and influential.
See generally MAUSS, supra note 14. Because the Realists focused on Anglo-Amencan sources in their
discussion of magic, I have omitted Mauss's and Durkheim's seminal works from this discussion. Their
influence is pervasive in the later work of Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, Douglas, and Turner, which I discuss
in Part III.
80. FRAZER, supra note 71, at 56.
81. FRAZER, supra note 71, at 25.
82. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 115-16.
83. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 116.
84. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 115-16.
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"and to conclude that association in thought must involve similar connexion in
reality. '85 So, according to Tylor, the primitive who notices similarities in
form or quality that link various objects in his mind assumes that manipulation
of one of these similar objects will cause a real world effect on another. 8 ' For
instance, the Trobriand Islanders touch their newly made canoes with plant
fronds that blow lightly in the wind in order to impart a similar quality of
lightness and speed to the boats. 87 In the Victorian scheme, magic is
definitively insubstantial and false. Yet, Victorian anthropologists were
ambivalent about whether the source of that falsehood was mostly willful
deception or naive delusion. 88 Frazer explained that magicians "perceive how
eas[y] it is to dupe their weaker brother and to play on his superstition for their

own advantage. '' 9 However, not every "sorcerer is always a knave and
impostor; he is often sincerely convinced that he really possesses those
wonderful powers which the credulity of his fellows ascribes to him." 90 The
credulity or duplicity of "savage" magic practitioners is one of the focal points
of Victorian anthropology. 9 1 In the Victorian view, however, the utter falsity of
magic is unambiguous. Whether a magician fools only his observers or himself
as well, magic's objects and effects are pure illusion. Magic is empty and
ineffectual-false92wonders that can only distract from or cover up what is
really happening.
B. The Realist Critique ofLegal Magic

Even if the Realists had never mentioned legal magic, there would be
recognizable parallels between their critique of adjudication and the Victorian
theory of magic. The Victorian definition of magic as a pseudo-scientific
practice that manipulates verbal formulas instead of investigating and
intervening in empirical reality anticipates the central Realist attack on legal
formalism as irrational, false science. The Victorian understanding of magic
also suggests a particular mistake or trick the Realists attributed to doctrinal
legal analysis: a distortion of analogical reasoning that mistakes "an ideal for a

85. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 116.
86. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 116 (discussing practices of burying hair and nail
clippings out of fear sorcerers would use them).
87. MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 129.
88. According to Tylor, "Magic has not its origin in fraud, and seems seldom practiced as an utter
imposture." TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 116. But neither is magic an innocent mistake.
The magician is "at once dupe and cheat." Id.
89. FRAZER, supra note 71, at 52.
90. FRAZER, supra note 71, at 52.
91. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 134.
92. "The modem educated world, rejecting occult science as a contemptible superstition, has practically
committed itself to the opinion that magic belongs to a lower level of civilization." TYLOR, PRIMITIVE
CULTURE, supra note 76, at 113.
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real connexion." 93 The Victorian idea that magic projects ideal associations
onto concrete objects 94 anticipates the Realist complaint that judges substitute
into
fictional legal concepts for relevant social facts, manipulate those concepts
95
patterns, and then mistake or cynically switch the patterns for reality.
My point is not that Victorian anthropology causally influenced the Realist
critique of law-although, such a connection is possible because there are
references to Frazer in Jerome Frank's work.96 What interests me is that for
whatever reason, the Realist critique of law mirrors the Victorian view of
magic as formalistic pseudo-science. 97 That similarity suggests why the
Realists were disposed to see adjudication as magical in the first place. More
importantly, the Realists' Victorian view of magic suggests why they failed to
consider the many practical ways adjudication resembles ritual magic as
authentic, potentially useful aspects of legal practice. Classic adjudicative
practice its emphasis on precedent, doctrine, and formal procedure-was for
the Realists what "primitive" magic was for the Victorians: a formalistic
simulation of scientific inquiry that confused subjective and objective
connections and thus was ultimately irrational and false.
1. Legal Magic Is Formalistic
No natural or social science has found its secrets in words and phrases and
neither will the science of law.
Leon Green98
The core Realist criticism of legal process is the charge of formalism. As
Felix Cohen explains, judges rely on verbal formulas-"the magic 'solving
words' of traditional jurisprudence"-to answer "legal problems" rather than
asking relevant empirical and ethical questions. 99 The Realists view doctrinal

93. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 116 (arguing "magic arts" result in confusing ideals for

reality).
94. See FRAZER, supra note 71, at 12-13, 25.

95. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 809-20 (surveying ways in which courts use and manipulate language).
96. See FRANK, supra note 7, at 158-59 n.5 (citing "the writings of Frazer"). Frank noted Frazer's
proposition that "the belief in... a disciplined universe is consistently acted upon only by primitive men,
children, and the insane." Id. But Frank also cited to later field anthropologists, including some of the
structural-functionalists whose revision of the Victorian view I will discuss in Part III. Felix Cohen cites

Bronislaw Malinowski's "functional" approach to social science as a model for a rational jurisprudence.
Cohen, supra note 4, at 831-32 nn.64-65.
97. One work that seems to have been influential for the Realists' views of magic language was Meaning
of Meaning by Ogden and Richards. Frank quotes from it at length, and Green also cites it for the idea that
"primitive man has a deeply rooted belief that 'a work has some power over a thing,"' that is, for the kind of
automatic effect of magic words the Victorians attributed to primitive magic. See Green, supra note 6, at 1016
n. I1; see also FRANK, supra note, 7 at 84-86.
98. Green, supra note 6, at 1018.

99. Cohen, supra note 4, at 820.
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concepts like "fair value," "due process," and "proximate cause" as illusory
verbal symbols that mask judges' reasoning process. 00 "We can scarcely
realize the part which sacred words, taboo words, magic words, continue to
play in our law," warned Leon Green in an early article. 011 According to
Green, doctrinal reasoning relies on a "language technic" rather than a
straightforward "judging technic" that acknowledges that men, not words,
decide cases.' 0 2 This atavistic focus on verbal formulas mistakes the
"machinery by which the power of thought is handled" for the power itself.10 3
It is a doomed effort at transcending the necessarily imperfect and ultimately
04
uncontrollable individual "exercise of that power we hand over to judges."'
At the heart of the Realist critiques of "word magic" is an insight that law's
doctrinal formulas have something in common with the way words are used in
magic and ritual practices. As Jerome Frank explained, "A word is used by the
savages when it can produce an action and not to describe one."' 0 5 For the
Realists, the use of such performative language in law, as well as magic,
entailed a naive belief in intrinsic, automatic verbal effects. Like "savages[,]
formalist legal practitioners demonstrate a conviction that words have power
over things, a theory of an inherent connection between symbols and things to
which the symbols refer."' 1 6 Frank speculated that in our legal system this kind
of "magical thinking" sprang from a need for certainty, stimulated by the
structure of law as (paternal) authority. 10 7 In his view, lawyers, children, and
primitive cultures share a desire, and a belief, that words have a transformative
08
power that civilized adults ascribe only to rational-technical interventions.1
The Realists' objection to the ostensible performative power of judicial
words was that their consequences in the real world were not self-executing. In
the Realists' instrumental view of law-and of language-words describe
situations in the world but do not change them. Resonant words like "duty" or
"right" do not determine the legal outcomes. 10 9 Judges are "merely using these
terms to pronounce the judgment passed. The process has been concluded in
some unknown way; the result is merely being vocalized."' "10 Likewise, for
everyone else, the judges' words are effective precisely because armed agents
stand ready to enforce them. The power of judicial language inheres not in the
words themselves but in the judges' power to decide who will be subjected to

100.
101.
102
103
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Cohen, supra note 4, at 820.
Green, supra note 6, at 1016.
Green, supra note 6, at 1016-19.
Green, supra note 6, at 1018.
Green, supra note 6, at 1020.
FRANK, supra note 7, at 85 (quotation & footnote ormtted).
FRANK, supra note 7, at 85.
See FRANK, supra note 7, at 158-59.
See FRANK, supra note 7, at 158-59.
See Green, supra note 6, at 1020-21.
Green, supra note 6, at 1021.
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the force of the state.
For Realists, language is enabling, not generative.
"[W]ords are the
machines by which the power of thought is handled," Green declared."' But
even that literally instrumental image may ascribe too much positive value to
legal language. 112 Later in the same article Green muses, "[A]n opinion is but
the smoke which indicates the grade of mental explosive employed.
Somewhere behind the curtains of legal expression lie the laboratories of our
intelligence. They are not legal. They comprise all we are." 113 Thus legal
language moves from a vehicle of legal reasoning to reasoning's ephemeral
trace to a screen obscuring the real reasoning process. And note that in Green's
description, the real mental work hidden behind the smokescreen of legal
language takes place in a scientific setting-a laboratory.
The insistence that authentic human thought processes are uniform and
autonomous behind "the curtains" of expression cuts off insights that otherwise
might flow from observing that ritual language is a key technique of
adjudication. 114 "Word ritual under one guise or another has always been one
of the primary modes of law administration," Green contends.115 But the
instrumentalist view that legal language is purely a means of communicating
decisions backed by force necessarily negates the transformative potential of
the verbal techniques Green painstakingly tracks.
Jerome Frank made a similar analysis of formal trial court procedures and
their impact on juries. Legal magic creates a "ceremonial routine," he says,
designed to instill confidence in the outcome of the trial. 11 6 For instance, the
"so-called 'cautionary instructions' to the jury-are they not, too, like debased
magic spells or cabalistic formulas ... ?,,117 Everyone knows, says Frank, that
judges' instructions to jurors not to be affected by emotion and to stick to the
evidence do not work. "If they do, why does the jury lawyer in his address to
the jury not confine himself to clear and concise logical arguments based on a
passionless summary of the evidence ... ?"' 18 Because, Frank answers, jurors
are swayed by emotional appeals. Then what purpose do the judge's solemn
exhortations serve? "These instructions are like exorcizing phrases intended to
drive out evil spirits."11 9 Perhaps, Frank suggests, the very unintelligibility of
the jury charge contributes to a kind of power, like the untranslatable
"tremendous words" used in medieval exorcisms. 120 For Frank, such power is
111. Green, supra note 6 at 1018.
112. See Green, supra note 6, at 1022.
113. See Green, supra note 6, at 1022.
114. See Green, supra note 6, at 1016.
115. See Green, supra note 6, at 1016.
116. FRANK, supra note 7, at 181.
117. FRANK, supra note 7, at 182.
118. FRANK, supra note 7, at 183.
119. FRANK, supra note 7, at 184.
120. FRANK, supra note 7, at 181.

2008]

A THEORY OFADJUDICATION LA WAS MAGIC

an illusion. Any belief that the formal charge could improve the jury's
decision-making process "smacks of child magic," employing "formulas and
key-words to conquer the environment without substantial effort." 121 Once
again, in the Realist view, meaning and truth are opposed to form and illusion.
If the formal jury charge is not substantively directive of jurors' reasoning, then
it must be entirely empty and false.
2. Legal Magic Substitutes Subjective Connectionsfor Objective Comparisons

Probably the most famous discussion of legal magic appears in Felix
Cohen's

1935

essay,

Transcendental Nonsense

and the

Functional

Approach.
Cohen focuses on a particular technique of judicial magic that
comes close to the Victorian analysis of magic's faulty associative reasoning.
For Cohen, the logical flaw in legal magic is the substitution-by design or by
mistake-of ideal fictions for realities. The conventional phrases that judges
manipulate stand for "thingified" abstractions that are mistakenly treated as real
entities. 123
These magical objects are elaborated into a complicated
metaphysical narrative that substitutes for policy analysis and hard ethical
choices.' 24 Criticizing judges' use of "magic solving words" like "fair value,"
"corporation," or "proximate cause" to justify their rulings, Cohen compares
analogic reasoning's reliance on metaphor to a sleight of hand, an illusion of
reason that covers up the absence of moral and practical analysis. 25 Jerome
Frank likewise criticized doctrinal "word magic" as "a trick resulting126from 'a
confusion of the subjective and objective in the conception of things."'
To exemplify this magical "thingification," Cohen criticizes Cardozo's
anthropomorphic treatment of a corporation in order to find a basis for the New
York court's jurisdiction over a company incorporated in Pennsylvania. "The
essential thing," said Judge Cardozo, writing for a unanimous court, "is that the
corporation shall have come into the State." Why this journey is essential, or
how it is possible, we are not informed. 127 In Cohen's view, this sort of
"supernatural" approach, whether mistaken or deliberate, treats a fictional legal
concept-a corporation-like a real entity-a person who "travels about from
State to State as mortal men travel."' 128 Cohen finds it absurd that the question
of jurisdiction should be decided, or defended, by imagining that the fictional
corporate being had acted autonomously. He wants an investigation of modern

121.

FRANK, supra note 7, at 181.

122. See generally Cohen, supra note 4.
123. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 811.
124. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 812.
125. Cohen, supra note 4, at 820-21.

126. FANK, supra note 7, at 64.
127. Cohen, supra note 4, at 811 (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y.

1917)).
128. Cohen, supra note 4, at 811.
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corporate practices and the "actual significance of the relation between a
corporation and the state of its incorporation" followed by a clear value
judgment about whether those activities should subject the business to suit in a
given sate. 129 For legal scholars, the goal should be to "substitute a realistic,
rational, scientific account of legal happenings" for what Cohen calls the
"theological0 jurisprudence of concepts" with its "legal magic and word' 13
jugglery."
Cohen's criticism of Cardozo's use of metaphoric associations in place of a
"factual inquiry" into the "actual significance of the relationship between a
corporation and the state of its incorporation" looks very much like Frazer's
131
explanation of "sympathetic magic," based on the principle of similarity.
Cohen complains that to determine personal jurisdiction over corporations,
judges play out the metaphoric identifications between corporate structures and
individuals, instead of inquiring empirically into real-life relationships among
corporations, the jurisdictions where they are located, and the people suing
them.132 Thus, says Cohen, the court espoused a "traditional supernatural
approach to practical legal problems."1' 33 The judges ignored or covered up the
real "social forces" that shaped the decision and instead grounded their decision
in "vivid fictions and metaphors."'1 34 Again, it goes back to a non-instrumental,
non-denotative use of words and the Realists' belief that such magical language
can only obstruct reasoning, never enhance it. As Green put it, "[t]he whole
confusion comes about by the legal theology which requires substituting a
symbolic phrase 'determination of duty' for the judgment required of a judge in
135
giving or denying the protection of government to the interest involved ....
,,
For the Realists, symbolic doctrinal phrases always replace or hamper
principled decision-making; they never facilitate it. For Cohen, determining
"where" a corporation is by analogizing it to a human being absurdly reifies the
metaphoric corporate "body." Like Tylor's savage practitioners of magic,
Cardozo mistook "an ideal for a real connexion." '1 3 6 As Jerome Frank

129.
130.
13 1.
commits

See Cohen, supra note 4, at 810.
Cohen, supra note 4, at 821.
Compare Cohen, supra note 4, at 810, with FRAZER, supra note 71, at 13. "Homeopathic magic
the mistake of assuming that things which resemble each other are the same." FRAZER, supra note 71,

at 13.
132. Cohen, supra note 4, at 810.
133. Cohen, supra note 4, at 813.
134. Cohen, supra note 4, at 812. It is ironic that the target of Cohen's diatribe against judicial magic is
Cardozo, who, besides sharing many of Cohen's liberal political views, was on record as a critic of systemic
legal magic. See Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) ("The law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view
today.") Then again, perhaps the attack makes sense. Cohen's discussion of Cardozo's opinion in Tauza is
filled with the sort of snarly contempt that is rarely directed at distant ideological enemies but reserved instead
for allies who have strayed from the proper path. Cohen, supra note 4, at 812.
135. Green, supra note 6, at 1030.
136. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE, supra note 76, at 116
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explained in remarkably Tylor-ish terms, law's doctrinal word magic is "a trick
resulting from 'a confusion of subjective and objective in the conception of
things."' 3 7
3. Legal Magic Is False
The realist believes that there is something more "real" than these rituals,
and he goes off in pursuit of that something.
Max Lerner

138

Like the Victorians, the Realists are confident that magic is essentially false,
but they are ambivalent about the relationship of magic practitioners to that
falsehood. According to Cohen, Realists "are in fundamental agreement in
their disrespect for 'mechanical jurisprudence,' for legal magic and wordjugglery."' 139 The problem is that legal magic apparently has some power to
deceive even those who ordinarily see through it. Realist non-believers may
have to engage in these illusionist tactics, says Cohen, when arguing before
judges who refuse to acknowledge the ethical and empirical judgments inherent
in their decisions. In that situation, the skeptical lawyer "will perforce bring his
materials to judicial attention by sleight-of-hand."' 140 He must use his "patter"
to induce favorable judicial attitudes and to distract judicial attention from
precedents and facts that look the wrong way, as the professional magician
distracts his audience from the trapdoor and hidden compartment. 14 1 But the
Realist conjurer must take care not to be fooled by his own performance. If he
starts thinking of the "vivid fictions and metaphors" he deploys as "reasons for
decisions[,] ... then the author, as well as the reader of the opinion or
argument, is apt to forget the social forces
which mold the law and the social
142
ideals by which the law is to be judged."'
While Cohen oscillates between presenting legal magicians as frauds or
dupes, Jerome Frank comes down clearly on the side of self-deception. We
depend on legal magic less to fool others, he suggests, than to reassure
ourselves. Given the volume of existing case law, Frank points out that "a
court can usually find earlier decisions which can be made to appear to justify
almost any conclusion."' 143 Existing precedent, therefore, cannot be the cause
of a yea or nay legal outcome. In the Realist/Victorian fraud/truth dichotomy,
precedential magic simply does not work. The fact that precedents are not
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

FRANK, supra note 7, at 64.
Max Lerner, The Shadow World of Thurman Arnold, 47 YALE L.J. 687, 695 (1938).
Cohen, supra note 4, at 821.
Cohen, supra note 4, at 841-42.
Cohen, supra note 4, at 841-42.
Cohen, supra note 4, at 812.
FRANK, supra note 7, at 152.
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logically determinative of subsequent cases renders them meaningless. Far
from defining judicial art, reliance on precedent can only obfuscate and detract
from the true judicial practice. "The concealment has merely made the labor of
the judges less effective."' 44 The Realists allow no inkling that post-hoc
rationalization of judicial decisions reached on other grounds could be
meaningful or constitute some authentic aspect of legal practice.1 45 Frank
makes no attempt to investigate, for instance, how courts' magical use of
precedent might distinguish legal practice institutionally. If precedents are not
the conceptual origin of the decisions that cite them, they must be worse than
useless. The illusory dependence on false precedents must inhibit judges from
grappling effectively with the complex dynamic world in which they are asked
to make decisions.
Like Tylor and Frazer, Frank questions why magic practitioners (here,
lawyers) who observe that the system to which they adhere fails to deliver on
its promises of certainty nevertheless continue to believe in it. But he never
questions the premise that leads to this contradiction-namely, that in the
primitive culture of adjudication, the (judicial) natives subscribe to a
counterfactual, literal belief in automatic mechanisms that are obviously false
and that necessarily interfere with a modem, rational approach to the problem
being adjudicated. 146 Mirroring the Victorian view, Frank concludes that
practitioners of legal magic are driven by a childish fear of "chance and
change"' 147 and a yearning
for the certainty that he regards as the "basic myth"
14 8
legal magic serves.

For Realists, the true belief in legal magic in no way mitigates its essential
duplicity. If anything, the sincerity with which judges practice legal magic
only makes it more obviously pathological. The "belief in such a disciplined
universe is consistently acted upon only by primitive men, children and the
insane," says Frank. 149 Legal magic's status as fraud or fancy might be

144. FRANK, supra note 7, at 157.

145. In contrast, Holmes, perhaps the least magical of all jurists, embraced the notion that individual case
results shaped general principles rather than vice versa. "It is the merit of the common law," he wrote, that "it
decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes and the
Arrangement of the Law, in I THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND
SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 212 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995).

146. Explicating his theory, Frank draws on the developmental theory of psychologist Jean Piaget,
describing individual mental maturation as a process of moving from an infantile belief that one can "magically
command responses on the part of the environment" to reason and acceptance of contingency. FRANK, supra
note 7, at 14, 326 n. 1. Frank also cites a number of anthropologists' work on "primitive" magic, among them
Malinowski and Frazer. FRANK, supra note 7, at 332 n.1, 334-35 n.9 (citing Malinowski); id. at 343 n.5 (citing
Frazer). Cohen and Green, likewise, cite to anthropological studies, though not necessarily work on magic.
Cohen, supra note 4, at 831 n.63, 831 n.64, 832 n.65 (citing Malinowski and Boaz); Green, supra note 6, at
1016 n.l .
147. FRANK, supra note 6, at 18.
148. FRANK, supra note 7, at 3.

149. FRANK, supra note 7, at 158-59.
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ambiguous, but there is no question that its falsity is irredeemably destructive
to the legal institutions it pervades.
C. Magical Realist: Thurman Arnold
The realist is ordinarily a man who is emotionally conscious of the
discrepancy between the behavior of the world and the way it talks about that
behavior. He is not, however, conscious of the fact that talking and writing is
just as much aform of behavior as eating.
150
Thurmond Arnold

One contemporary of Green, Cohen, and Frank took a different view of the
formal and doctrinal aspects of adjudication that the Realists called legal magic.
Thurman Arnold is often counted as a Realist.1 51 Certainly, he shared the
Realists' skepticism about the logical determinism of legal doctrines and
procedures. "Our law schools and courts refuse to admit publicly that legal
doctrine is simply a method of argument and classification of cases," Arnold
wrote, "Their function is rather to keep an ideal alive."' 52 But Arnold critiqued
the Realists' view that doctrine and formal procedure were therefore either
worthless or positively harmful. His investigations of legal "symbols"
incorporate, and sometimes prefigure, the functional, structural, and symbolic
theories of modem
anthropology that would revise the Victorian views of
153
magic and ritual.
Arnold's central insight was that the symbolic and ritual aspects of legal
practice were not necessarily false and corrupting despite not being grounded in
empirical fact or overt value judgments. Arnold suggests that the symbolic
aspects of legal practice might have a useful, even definitive, function.154 In his
view, "folklore" or "spiritualism" could not be expunged from our legal system
without fundamentally altering its character.
Arnold argues that legal ceremonies, especially trials, work to symbolically
reconcile conflicting social norms. It is precisely the symbolic nature of
adjudication, he argues, that makes such reconciliation possible. The dramatic
conflict of emotional trials allows us to "talk in different ways about the same
problems without appearing to contradict ourselves."' 5 5 "It is child's play for
the realist to show that law is not what it pretends to be," says Arnold, "[and]
150. THURMOND ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 6 (1935) [hereinafter ARNOLD, SYMBOLS].
151. See e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 74 (1949)
(listing Arnold in a subgroup of Realists called "fact skeptics," along with Leon Green and others).
152. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 45.
153. See generally ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 150.
154. See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 111,113; see also THURMON ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF
CAPITALISM 46-47 (1937).
155. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 248.
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that it constantly seeks escape from reality through alternate reliance on
ceremony and verbal confusion."' 56 For Arnold, however, law's unrealistic
reliance on ceremony is "not its weakness but its greatest strength."' 157 Through
their symbolic action legal institutions can appear coherent while158"tolerating
and enforcing ideals which run in all sorts of opposing directions."'
For Cohen and Frank, a symbolic reconciliation of substantively
contradictory norms would be necessarily illusory and false. But Arnold sees
something potentially valuable that does not necessarily conflict with
rationality. Law's enacted ceremonies of ideological conflict and reconciliation
may increase society's capacity to tolerate diverse ideologies. Thus, the
symbolic aspect of legal process makes possible the pluralism characteristic of
a liberal society. Likewise, ideological tolerance supports the dramatic conflict
institutionalized in law. Arnold observes that "[t]he judicial system rises in
power and
prestige when society ... becomes able to tolerate contradictory
59
ideals."'
Arnold does not claim that law's symbolic reconciliation of inconsistent
values always produces just results in individual cases. In his view, norms are
not determinative of substantive individual results. He notes that judges may
be especially careful about following procedure with defendants they believe
will be convicted. They can afford to give a blatantly guilty defendant "every
protection because of the fact that these protections can do him no good."' 6 °
For Arnold, the real beneficiary of symbolic, ceremonial trial procedures is the
public. Trials are a public drama, enacting two main conflicts: (1) fairness
versus law enforcement,' 61 and (2) "the dignity of the State as an enforcer of
law" versus "the dignity of the individual when he is an avowed opponent of
the State."' 62 Because these enacted conflicts foster public discussion of "all
the various contradictory attitudes about crime and criminals," they function as
163
a "stabilizing agency."'
Arnold's theory that trials symbolically reconcile conflicting social values
resembles a theory of ritual and symbolism later developed by anthropologist
Victor Tuner. 164 Beyond their shared belief that ritual symbolically resolves
normative conflicts, both Turner and Arnold saw ritual as a fundamental
cultural phenomenon. Instead of viewing ritual as a projection of existing
social organization, they saw social organization as in part the product of ritual.
SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 44.
SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 44.
SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 44.
SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 248
SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 139.
SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 149.
SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 130.
SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 147.
164. See generally VICTOR TURNER, THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL (1966)
[hereinafter TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS] (outlining theory of ritual practice social significance).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

ARNOLD,
ARNOLD,
ARNOLD,
ARNOLD,
ARNOLD,
ARNOLD,
162. ARNOLD,
163. ARNOLD,
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As Turner explained, ritual is something other than an "epiphenomenon-the
result of some other more basic social force or institution."'' 65 He accorded
66
ritual "ontological" status as a social practice with its own primary meaning.1
Likewise, Arnold rejected the Realist view that legal ritual was secondary to
the social facts that determined individual legal outcomes. 167 He saw that
procedural and doctrinal rituals worked in a way parallel to or intertwined with
other social structures and ideals to give adjudication its social meaning.
Green, Cohen, and Frank always see legal doctrines and rituals as covering
up the "real" legal analysis. 168 While Arnold agreed that legal forms and
doctrines have more in common with ritual magic than with science, he
rejected the conclusion that legal magic is therefore necessarily a way to avoid
real legal practice. "[A]t times we eat and sleep and at other times we engage
ceremony," he explained, "[but neither activity] is an escape from
in parade and
' 69
other."'
the
Today, when judges and law professors remark on the ceremonial or ritual
quality of law, they generally intend the reference to be derogatory. The
skeptical work of Green, Cohen, and Frank is associated with discussions of
law's "magic words" and "talismanic" reasoning in case law and the legal
academy. But is Arnold's more nuanced view of the social role of ritual and
symbol, which has won the day in the social sciences, that which the three
better known Realists avowedly embraced?
III.

FROM MAGIC AS FALSE SCIENCE TO MAGIC AS EFFECTIVE
SOCIAL PRACTICE

Frazer's presentation of the magical and religious views of mankind is
unsatisfactory; it makes these views appearas errors.
Ludwig Wittgenstein

170

Part of the Realist project was an effort to open up legal questions to the
empirical methods of the social sciences developing in the first part of the
twentieth century. It is thus especially ironic that around the same time the
Realists were rejecting legal magic as false science, the first field

165. VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS & METAPHORS: SYMBOLIC ACTION IN HUMAN SOCIETY 57 (1974)
[hereinafter TURNER, DRAMA].
166. Id.at 57.
167. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 251.
168. See, e.g., Green, supra note 6, at 1021. "The formulas in which judgments have been couched have
been highly important factors in men's dealings," but these doctrinal formulas are nevertheless merely "terms"
judges use "to pronounce the judgment passed. The process has been concluded in some unknown way; the
result is merely being vocalized." Id.
169. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 150, at 251.
170. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON FRAZER'S GOLDEN BOUGH 10 (1979).
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anthropologists-some of whom the Realists cite in their work-were revising
the Victorian view of magic as science's "bastard sister."'1 71 Studying the
practices of the Trobriand Islanders, the great functionalist Bronislaw
Malinowski observed that magic is not about direct control of nature. Rather,
for practitioners, magic is a "power of man over his own creations, over things
' 72
once brought forth by man, or over responses of nature to his activities."'
Malinowski saw that Trobriand magic apparently coexisted with an accurate
technical understanding of the world, or at least with much useful technical
know-how. He pointed out, for instance, that the Trobrianders he studied were
masterful gardeners with "extensive knowledge of the classes of soil, of the
173
various cultivated plants, of the mutual adaptation of these two factors."'

They were "guided by a clear knowledge of weather and seasons, plants and
pests, soil and tubers, and by a conviction that this knowledge is sure and
reliable."' 174 Yet, despite this technical proficiency, "mixed with all their
activities there is to be found magic, a series of rites performed every year over
the gardens in rigorous sequence and order."' 175 What were those rituals for?
Malinowski's observations sometimes suggest that magic practitioners
themselves understand ritual as directed at changing the social worldview of its
inhabitants. Thus, magic language may be made up of counterfactual
affirmations of conditions "desired but not yet fulfilled," but its effects need not
be achieved through automatic intervention in the physical universe. 176 A
garden magician's spells ostensibly address the soil to be planted, declaring the
"belly of the garden rises."' 177 The Trobrianders do not understand these
magical affirmations as merely describing an expected future condition. But
neither do they view the magician as engaged only in a literal communication
with an inanimate plot of ground. 178 That is, they do not believe that his words
alone can make the harvest burst forth out of dead earth. Although he never
expressly embraces the idea, Malinowski's observations point to another modus
operandi for magic: that it affects its human practitioners and observers.179

171. James Frazer, Preface to MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at xiii.
172. MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 401.
173. MALINOWSKi, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 57-58.
174. MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 58-59.
175. MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 59.
176. 2 BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS AND THEIR MAGIC: THE LANGUAGE OF MAGIC AND
GARDENING 70 (Indiana Univ. Press 1965) (1935) [hereinafter MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS II].
177. Id. at 70.
178. Stanley Tambiah comments, "Malinowski was quite clear in his mind that Trobriand magical ideas
should not be confused with ideas of determinism implied in their practical activities." STANLEY TAMBIAH,
CULTURE, THOUGHT AND SOCIAL ACTION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 54 (1985) [hereinafter
TAMBIAH, CULTURE].
179. See MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS II, supra note 176, at 70. Malinowski's comparison of the garden
magician's exhortations of fertility to social flattery provides an example:
[l1n the designation of people by titles which are just a little above their rank, in the incorrect and
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Stanley Tambiah has pointed out that the yamhouse rites described in Part I
of this Article exemplify magic grammatically addressed to an inanimate object
but understood by its practitioners to affect the people who hear it.' 80 After the
yam harvest, the Trobrianders conduct rites to "anchor" the yams in their
storehouse. A full storehouse signifies a strong economy. It is better, then, for
the gathered yams to rot there than to be taken out and eaten. The magician
performs the rites over the storehouse where the spells invoke metaphors of
anchoring, make comparisons to bedrock and a coral outcrop, and refer to
stability and plenty.1 81 Malinowski observed, however, that the Trobrianders
"have not the slightest doubt that the magic does not act directly on the
substance of the food but on the human organism, more specifically on the
human belly... ,,182 If the rite were not performed, a magician explained,
"men and women would want to eat all the time, morning, noon and evening.
Their bellies would grow big, they would swell-all the time they would want
more and more food. I make the magic, the belly is satisfied, it is rounded
up. 183 At first, this might seem to be just another physical displacement
because magic that works directly on stomachs seems to us just as physical as a
spell that works on a storehouse. Apparently the Trobrianders, however, view
the stomach as the seat of both hunger and memory. So, when they speak of
something working on people's stomachs, it is something like what we mean
when we say that something affects our heads-that is, it influences the mind
Rather than directly exhorting the villagers to leave the storehouse alone, the
magic rite uses the metaphoric capacity of language to create an image of
fullness and stability on which people can focus in order to restrain their
appetites.184 Such poetic indirection is not merely ceremonial but may produce
real results. Anyone who has tried to lose weight by dieting will appreciate the
value of an alternative approach to a straightforward command to eat less. The
storehouse magic uses metaphor to renew and strengthen the villagers' sense of
their capacity to feel full and strong even with empty stomachs and to take their
minds off eating.
Although the spell ostensibly addresses the yamhouse, Malinowski's
informants insisted that it worked by influencing their bellies, where their

flattering use of terms of affection or kinship, we have the same principle of verbal magic. The word
claims more than actually exists, and thus places upon the person addressed certain obligations, or
puts him under some sort of emotional constraint.
Id.
180. TAMBIAH, CULTURE, supra note 178, at 51-53. Tambiah extends this notion into a general theory. "It
is possible to argue that all ritual, whatever the idiom, is addressed to the human participants and uses a
technique which attempts to restructure and integrate the minds and emotions of the actors." Id. at 53.
181. MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS I, supra note 28, at 226.
182. MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS I, supra note 28, at 226.
183. MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS 1, supra note 28, at 227.
184. See TAMBIAH, CULTURE, supra note 178, at 52-53.
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minds were thought to be. Semantically, magic emulates direct technical
intervention in the natural world-here, for example, by using counterfactual
statements that seem directed toward making the yam storehouse physically
impregnable. But, at the same time, magic language is "transparently rhetorical
and performative (in that it consists of acts185to create effects on human actors
according to accepted social conventions)."
Another great early theorizer of magic, Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, shared
and extended Malinowski's insight that magic need not conflict with accurate
technical know-how. According to Evans-Pritchard, "[w]itchcraft explains
why events are harmful to man and not how they happen."'1 86 He explained that
among the Azande of Central Africa, "[W]itchcraft is the socially relevant
cause, since it is the only one which allows intervention and determines social
behaviour."' 187 Regarding the Victorians' belief that magic falsified the natural
world, Evans-Pritchard explained, "The error here was in not recognizing that
the associations are social and not psychological stereotypes, and that they
occur therefore only when evoked in specific ritual situations .. ,,188
The Azande themselves explained witchcraft through a hunting metaphor
that captures the idea of magic partnering with rather than opposing natural
causes.189 The Azande apportion the meat from a successful hunt both to the
man who first speared the animal and to the man whose spear finished the job,
who is known as "the second spear."' 190 Together the two hunters killed their
quarry. Likewise, "if a man is killed by an elephant[,] Azande say that the
elephant is the first spear and that witchcraft is the second spear and that
together they killed the man."' 9 1 Magic is viewed as nature's partner, and
magical intervention is interwoven with natural causes. Thus, explanation of
reality in terms of magic is not incompatible with an accurate, rational
Instead, magic concerns people's
understanding of the natural world.
individual and social relations with reality.

185. TAMBIAH, MAGIC, supra note 16, at 82. Our conception of magic language and its ambiguous
position on the continuum between remote physical action and expressive communication, implicates magic's
relationship with science and religion. Tylor distinguished magic and prayer on precisely this line. Suzanne
Last Stone, one of the very few contemporary legal scholars to notice and discuss law's relationship with
magic, adopts this distinction as the definitional difference between adjudication and magic. Stone points to
uncertainty as the key: "like magic, law is esotenc and, like magic, it is manipulative, coercive, and for a fee.
The crucial difference, as with all aggressive prayer, is the factor of uncertainty. Litigation, like aggressive
prayer, is thus an intermediate category between coercion and supplication." Last Stone, supra note 10, at 122.
186. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, supra note 14, at 24.
187. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, supra note 14, at 25.
188. E. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THEORIES OF PRIMITIVE RELIGION 29 (1965). In the 1920s, Evans-Pritchard
did field work in Central Africa, and in 1937 published his still classic study Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic
among the Azande. The book argues that Zande belief in witchcraft and their practice of divination and magic
to identify and combat witches readily coexist with technical knowledge of the natural world.
189. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, supra note 14, at 25.

190.
191.

EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT,

supra note 14, at 25.
14, at 25-26.
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In the mid-twentieth century, focusing on the ways ritual helped shape social
reality, Victor Turner and Mary Douglas urged a shift in Western
understandings of ritual practices. In their analyses, ritual not only expresses or
highlights aspects of experience, but by externalizing experience, actually
creates and changes it. 19 2 The insight that ritual has a non-instrumental,
socially constructive role to play is crucial to revising the understanding of
ritual and magic in the twentieth century. As Mary Douglas says in her
reinterpretation of Lienhardt's observations of Dinka religion, "[R]ituals create
and control experience. ' 93 Though rituals may fail to affect experiences in a
natural-physical sense, they are not necessarily socially ineffective. Here,
rituals' performative nature is key. Beyond what Douglas calls their "Aladdinand-the-lamp face value," rituals have another sort of power:
Of course Dinka hope that their rites will suspend the natural course of events.
Of course they hope that rain rituals will cause rain, healing rituals avert death,
harvest rituals produce crops. But instrumental efficacy is not the only kind of
efficacy to be derived from their symbolic action. The other kind is achieved in
the action itself, in the assertions it makes and the experience which bears its
imprinting. 194
Victor Turner came to see the conflicting and multivocal aspects of ritual
symbols as central to the work they did in creating social meaning. He
observed, for instance, that Ndembu rituals ostensibly dedicated to a particular
social ideal often enacted conflicts with that norm.1 95 In everyday life, Turner
explained, Ndembu social norms are sometimes "situationally incompatible, in
the sense that they give rise to conflicts of loyalties."' 96 For example, a
woman's nurturing closeness with her daughter conflicts with her allegiance to
the tribal tradition of removing girls from their mother's care when they are
initiated as adult members of society. Turner found that initiation rituals,
superficially glorifying the girl's achievement of adult status and the solidarity
of the tribe, enacted rather than suppressed this maternal conflict. Enacting the
mother's loss, the ritual barred the mother from the ring of dancing adult
women who surround her daughter, and the mother and daughter exchanged
clothes, recalling the Ndembu mourning custom of wearing a dead relative's
clothing.' 97 In terms of individual experience, the conflict between tribal

192. DOUGLAS, PURITY, supra note 16, at 67; TURNER, DRAMA, supra note 164, at 56.
193. DOUGLAS, PURITY, supra note 16, at 67.
194. DOUGLAS, PURITY, supra note 16, at 69.
195. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 4 (discussing Ndembu rules governing residences).
For example, "[p]eople who observe one set of norms find that this very observance makes them transgress
equally valid rules belonging to another set." Id.
196. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 4.
197. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 24.
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solidarity and mother love may be unresolvable. In Turner's view, however,
the ritual enacted a social reconciliation of that conflict.' 98 Arnold would say
that the symbolic reconciliation allowed the conflicts between tribal solidarity
and mother love and between99filial attachment and the assumption of adult
status to flourish side-by-side. 1
Turner theorized that ritual symbols work by juxtaposing two different
modes of experience-sensory and normative. 200 He found that important
ritual symbols refer on the one hand to physiological, natural, or sensory
experience and on the other to normative or ideological meanings. 20 1 For
instance, the Ndembu girls' puberty ritual is conducted at the foot of a tree that
exudes a milky white latex when its bark is scratched.20 2 Turner's Ndembu
informants told him that this "milk tree," as he calls it, stood for human breast
milk and the breasts that supply the milk. 203 Not surprisingly, the ritual is
conducted at the time that a girl's breasts mature, and its main theme is the tie
of nurturing between mother and child.20 4 The Ndembu also said that "[t]he
milk tree is the place of all mothers of the lineage .... [and] is where our
ancestress slept when she was initiated., 20 5 Finally, they explained that in their
matrilineal society, the milk tree "is the place of our tribal custom... ,where
we began, even men just the same...." 206 Thus, the tree symbolized the
solidarity and development of Ndembu society along with the girl's individual
development toward motherhood.20 7 According to Turner, this disparity20 8of
reference is typical of symbols that are the focal points of important rituals.
Turner's analysis then tracks Arnold's description of legal ritual. Rather
than treating the ambiguity of symbolic meaning as a logical weakness, he
presents it as a social strength. Because of their sensory referents, symbols like
the milk tree evoke meanings that "arouse desires and feelings," while their
ideological meanings suggest values that ground and control individual
experience. 2 09 Ultimately, the symbols tend to unite their physiological and
moral frames of reference.
was
Turner theorized that the symbolic "union[] of 'high' and 'low'
21
associated with ritual's social function.
The idea is that the condensation in
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ritual symbols of sensory affective content with social ideals tends to combine
the two in the minds of ritual participants. "Norms and values, on the one
hand, become saturated with emotion, while the gross and basic emotions
become ennobled through contact with social values." 2 11 Ritual achieves its
status as a primary social experience in part through this dynamic tension. In
the dramatic conflict between norms and the combination of norms and affect,
ritual can create, as well as express, social roles, attitudes, and relationships.
For Turner, ritual is "a mechanism that periodically converts the obligatory into
the desirable." 2 12 As he explained it, "[R]itual symbols are not merely signs
representing known things; they are felt to possess ritual efficacy, to be charged
with power from unknown sources," and thus,2 13to be able to change those who
come into contact with them in ritual contexts.
Like Arnold, Turner appreciated that transformative ritual did not merely
express static social categories and norms; it constructed those norms and
conflicts among them. Thus, ritual was not necessarily a tool for representing
and reifying a monolithic version of reality and morality. 214 Indeed, ritual may
not be a tool at all. Instead of thinking of ritual instrumentally, as a mechanism
for social expression and social control, we can think of it as a kind of, or
aspect of, experience that generates and expresses social reality. Ritual may
sometimes enforce dominant social categories. But in Turner's and Arnold's
conception, it is theoretically capable of creating and maintaining conflicting
social norms through symbolic recreations and reconciliations of conflicts.215
The different perspectives of Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, Douglas, and
Turner-and, in the legal context, Arnold-share the view that magic and ritual
can coexist with rational understanding. In fact, they suggest that, in some
contexts, magic may enhance the effectiveness of rational techniques that
transform social and, ultimately, physical situations. Magic produces real
social effects. Such effective magic might produce beneficial or harmful
(legitimate or illegitimate) results, depending on the practitioner's goals and
skills, the particular situation, the sociocultural setting, and, of course, the point
of view of the person evaluating those results.

211. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 30.
212. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 30.
213. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 54.
214. Compare the treatment of narrative in law. As others have noted, narratives may be hegemonic as
well as subversive. See generally Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories & Hegemonic Tales:
Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 197 (1995).

215. As I have already pointed out, Arnold's analysis of legal rituals sometimes comes remarkably close to
Turner's later anthropological theory of ritual drama and its role in regulating conflicts among social values.
Compare, for instance. Arnold's view that a criminal trial ostensibly dedicated to truth-finding actually
dramatizes the conflict between the social ideals of "the dignity of the State as an enforcer of law" and "the
See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note
dignity of the individual when he is an avowed opponent of the State ....
150, at 130.
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OF LEGAL MAGIC

It is the essence of magic that, by the affirmation of a condition which is
desired but not yet fulfilled, this condition is brought about.
2 6
Bronislaw Malinowski 1

[T]o understandthat law is socially grounded is to enable us to harness the
transformativepower of law as a means of social construction.
Steven L. Winter

21 7

In this section, I will develop two main results from the anthropological
reanalysis of legal magic. First, I will theorize a ritual-magic mode of
adjudication that is not necessarily contrary to legal reason. Then, I will
discuss three potential roles for this ritual-magic mode of legal practice: as a
way to imbue official articulations of legal norms and decisions with the
affective moral force of lived experience, as an institutional practice that may
enhance judicial and jury impartiality, and as a ritual-symbolic method for
enacting a kind of social triumph over morbidity and death.
A. The Centrality and Authenticity of Legal Magic as a Mode of Legal Practice
To this day, much of the debate about the value of precedential practices,
procedural formality, and doctrinal reasoning remains wedded to the either-or
understanding of the Victorians and Realists. In this view, rules and doctrines
either help determine an objectively correct (and thus predictable) outcome, or
they are meaningless trappings of a false ceremony that obscure the subjective
individual interpretive process that actually produces legal results. Legal
decisions are either the product of autonomous authors' subjective judgments
Legal
or they are determined objectively by doctrine and precedent.
compliance is either coerced or freely chosen.
Contrary to the Victorian/Realist view, the work I discussed in the last
section rejects this either-or, P-or-not-P, vision. Instead, the metaphoric
language of ritual magic is conceived as a social practice that not only
expresses thoughts and experiences, accurately or inaccurately, but alters or
attempts to alter experience. "Although ritual conveys information about the
most basic conceptual categories and ordering systems of the social group, it is
used primarily to transform one category into another while maintaining the
integrity of the categories and the system as a whole. ' 2 18 As Mary Douglas has

216. MALINOWSKI, CORAL GARDENS I, supra note 28, at 70.
217. Winter, supra note 27, at 1197.
218. CATHERINE BELL, RITUAL: PERSPECTIVES AND DIMENSIONS 44 (1997).
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explained, ritual is not like a map or illustration, a model or guide for an
experience we would otherwise have in some other way. 21 9 Through its unique
social practice, ritual changes experience. Likewise, adjudication's primary
social role is not explanation. Rather, court proceedings are intended to
intervene in the social world in transformative ways.
The Realists' antiformalist point is that legal language cannot really work
automatic changes in society anymore than a stage magician can really make a
rabbit materialize out of an empty hat. But this critique presumes a classically
Victorian view of magic. Ritual magic need not aim for this kind of false
automatic effect. To the extent that ritual is instead understood as a mode of
accomplishing social transformation through its effects on group participants,
adjudication's ritual magic techniques appear well adapted to accomplishing
social change.
The work of Bronislaw Malinowski, Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, and
especially Victor Turner and Mary Douglas helps us appreciate that the
Realists' skepticism about legal magic was tied to their instrumental view of
law and the assumption that human thought processes are and should be
autonomous and impenetrable. In contrast, the notion of a performative effect
and the transformative impact of magic depends on a heightened susceptibility
to others' language. For instance, in both Malinowski's observations of the
yamhouse magic and Turner's theories of the way ritual symbols operate, what
is being described is not the sort of vulnerability to automatic magic that the
Victorians theorized. But neither is it communication entirely mediated by the
conscious reasoning of an autonomous subject. Here, ritual is conceived as a
special combination of gestures, language, and circumstances that together
create a kind of hyperpersuasive communication experienced by participants as
reconstituting their experience of the world.
In contrast, the Realists cannot conceive of an authentic ritual legal
technique that shapes adjudicative decisions. From their perspective, every
judge "must employ the processes of intelligent men generally," and grapple
with a problem's values and facts just like everyone else. 220 Of course, this
observation is unassailable in one sense.
Whatever practice-ritual or
otherwise-a judge employs in making her decision, she will contribute, and be
limited by, her own insight and experience. Modem anthropology of magic,
however, challenges the Realists' insistence that the individual mind is the sole
determinant of legal judgment and thus that the techniques of legal magic are
empty. In these theories, magic need not pose a choice between real automatic
effects (here, the logical determination of an objectively preferable legal result)
and no magical effects. The Trobriand Islanders conduct the yamhouse rites in
language ostensibly aimed at the buildings themselves.
But Trobriand

219. See DOUGLAS, PURITY, supra note 16, at 65.
220 Green, supra note 6, at 1020.
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practitioners understand the rites as aimed at and affecting their own appetites.
Similarly, the legal determination that a warehouse is "public" will
ultimately be enforceable by state-sanctioned violence; but that does not render
the metaphorical and performative language used by the judges who make that
decision necessarily ineffective or empty. From the Victorian/Realist point of
view, practitioners of magic, legal or otherwise, are the victims or perpetrators
of a trick that confuses the limits of subjective and objective categories. But
once we consider that the objects of magical and legal transformation are, as
Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard stressed, social rather than physical facts, we
might see this method as authentically transformative.
The two different anthropological views of magic can also shed light on a
current issue regarding courts' precedential practices. In many states, nocitation rules bar discussion of recent state appellate court decisions, which are
labeled "nonprecedential." Until recently, four of the busiest federal courtsthe Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal-likewise
forbade lawyers and lower 22court
judges from citing their courts' summary
"nonprecedential" decisions. 1
The leading federal case defending the constitutionality of no-citation rules
222
and nonprecedential opinions is a Ninth Circuit decision, Hart v. Massanari.
Hart's formalistic model of the binding power of precedent recalls the belief in
automatic magic that the Victorians ascribed to practitioners of primitive
magic. "If a court must decide an issue governed by a prior opinion that
constitutes binding authority, the later court is bound to reach the same
result .... "223 It is as if once a judge recognizes that a relevant precedential
case exists, the old ruling decides the new case for her. "[B]inding authority is
very powerful medicine," intones Hart.224 The metaphor of a drug, which acts

221. This is not a matter of excluding a few marginal decisions. Under these rules, in 2003, the Ninth
Circuit forbade citation to 84% of its decisions. In the Second Circuit, 75% of cases were unavailable as
precedent, as were 57% of Seventh Circuit decisions. STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, 36 tbl.S-3 (2003). The

jurisdictions whose intermediate appellate courts forbid citation of some (usually most) decisions are Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. See JESSIE ALLEN,
THE RIGHT TO CITE:

WHY FAIR AND ACCOUNTABLE COURTS SHOULD ABANDON NO-CITATION RULES

3

(Brennan Center 2005) [hereinafter ALLEN, RIGHT TO CITE], available at

http://www.nonpublication.com/allen.pdf.
222. 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001). The case arose when a California lawyer cited a "nonprecedential"
summary disposition of the Ninth Circuit in violation of that court's rules and was ordered to show cause why
he should not be sanctioned. Id. at 1159. The lawyer responded by citing an Eighth Circuit opinion (since
vacated as moot on other grounds) striking down that court's rule allowing nonprecedential cases as a violation
of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Id. In Hart, the Ninth Circuit rejected the constitutional challenge and
upheld both the nonprecedential treatment and the citation ban, though the court did not impose sanctions on
the attorney. Id. at 1180.

223. Id. at 1170.
224. Id. at 1171.
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without regard for the will or desire of the person who swallows it, is telling.
In Hart's world, the judge takes her precedential medicine, and the medicine
decides the case.
It is not surprising that in such a world judges would want a powerful
antidote to control unforeseen side effects of their precedential "medicine." In
Hart's view, when judges speak or write officially, their words acquire an
automatic effect, regardless of the context. The opinion thus adopts the black
and white approach ascribed to magic practitioners by Victorians and Realists.
From this perspective, the only way to control the power of legal words is to
suppress them. Indeed, the ritual-magic explanation for the no-citation rules
makes a good deal more sense than many commonly offered explanations.
Complaints that with open citation, judges will have to defend departures from
prior rulings and spend more time ensuring the accuracy of their summary
225
decisions are indefensible from the point of view of judicial accountability.
Claims that summary opinions have no informational value are simply
incorrect. 6 But, if judges understand their own legal magic as either
automatically transformative or utterly illusory, then we can understand why
they fear future repetition of hastily written summary opinions.
Like the court reporter described in Part I who erased the trial judge's words
about contempt, courts use no-citation rules to suppress judicial language that
might otherwise trigger unintended legal effects. Just as the Victorians' view
of magic explains Hart's formalist jurisprudence, the later work of Malinowski,
Evans-Pritchard, and Turner suggests an alternative approach to the unruly
power of judicial language.
Precedent can be conceived as evolving
continuously through each new application. Indeed, this is the traditional
common-law approach.2 27 According to Malinowski, the Trobriand Islanders
applied a similar approach to their magic spells.228 Although Trobrianders
perceive magic as timeless, "a magical formula is in reality constantly being
shaped as it passes from one generation to another, and even within the mind of
the same man." 229 For instance, the Trobrianders reworked traditional fishing
magic to accommodate a new practice of diving for pearls. 230 In the either-or
Victorian view of magic words, however, precedential "medicine" is either
automatically binding or unreal. Judges (and others) proceeding from this view
understandably fear that treating precedent as subject to reinterpretation will
rob judicial words of power.
No-citation rules are a solution that allows courts to maintain a black-andwhite view of judicial decisions. They ascribe a naYve, automatic power to
225. See ALLEN, RIGHT TO CITE, supra note 220, at 7-8; Allen, Just Words, supra note 49, at 572-73.
226. See ALLEN, RIGHT TO CITE, supra note 220, at 10-14; Allen, Just Words, supra note 49, at 579-82.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Allen, Just Words, supra note 49, at 600-01.
MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 402.
MALINOWSKi, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 402.
MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS, supra note 14, at 402.

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW

[Vol. XLI:773

designated precedents and no power at all to opinions labeled
"nonprecedential." In this light, no-citation rules appear primarily as a defense
of precedential authority. Words that must be suppressed to prevent their
otherwise unmanageable effect are powerful indeed. Though Hart's main
focus is ostensibly on the legitimacy of nonprecedential, uncitable summary
decisions, subsequent opinions have often
cited Hart for its avowal of the
23 1
"binding" power of designated precedent.
If we look at precedential magic in light of the symbolic theories I described
in the previous section, no-citation rules may weaken rather than strengthen the
power of the remaining citable precedents. In the works of Turner and
Douglas, ritual techniques emerge as having real power to bring about social
effects through their symbolic enactments. 232 From this perspective, precedent
appears as a symbolic technique through which judges' words acquire
enhanced power that may be undermined by no-citation rules. In a precedential
system, it is understood by all the participants that when judges speak or write,
they commit themselves to unforeseeable and uncontrolable legal effects. In
this way, within the ritual of adjudication, judges assume for their words the
kind of risk we all face daily in our physical actions, as we stumble forward
through our embodied lives. Acceptance of this ongoing risk may be part of
what entitles judicial words to transform ordinary people's lives.
Importantly, this magical symbolic connection between precedent and bodily
action can accommodate a more flexible view of precedent. Although our
physical actions are irrevocable and we cannot foresee all their subsequent
effects, we can make adjustments to respond to those effects. When we find
that by shoring up a wall in one place we have inadvertently weakened it
somewhere else, we can fix the new weak spot, or perhaps decide to reinforce
the whole structure in a different way and occasionally recognize that we have
to tear the whole thing down and start again. What we cannot do without
consequence is ignore the effects of our initial hammering and proceed as
though the weakening never happened.
If precedent sets judicial words apart, making them at once less like ordinary
words and more like ordinary actions, then no-citation rules undermine that
symbolic shift. Allowing judges to pick and choose which words carry
potential unintended consequences makes all their words seem less like chancy
physical action. We surely do not have the power to select in advance which of
our physical acts will have lasting impact. The symbolic identification of

231. See Doyle v. Warden, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ("[A] district judge may not
'disagree with his learned colleagues on his own court of appeals who have ruled on a controlling legal issue."'
(quoting Hart v. Massanan, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001))); In Re Purchasepro.com, Inc., 332 B.R. 417,
422 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005) ("Binding authority must be followed unless and until overruled by a body

competent to do so").
232. See generally TURNER, DRAMA, supra note 165 (examining power of ritual techniques); DOUGLAS,
PURITY, supra note 16 (observing change through rituals' symbolic enactments).
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precedential language with action and the ritual impact of precedential rulings
are weakened in a no-citation regime.
In this way, no-citation courts
undermine a technique that symbolically charges judges' words with23 a3 power to
affect reality that we otherwise associate with physical intervention.
With some help from anthropology, we can see legal magic as an authentic
mode of legal practice, rather than as a corruption or obfuscation of legal
interpretation and legal enforcement. Legal magic has "ontologic" status, in
Turner's parlance, in between or alongside the better-recognized modes of
interpretation and enforcement. 234 Like interpretation and enforcement, legal
magic can be done well or poorly, with or without authority we would
recognize as legitimate, and have socially beneficial or detrimental results.
There is nothing marginal about law's ritual-magic mode. To the contrary,
assuming it would be possible to jettison all ritual-magic aspects of today's
legal process, the resulting institution would be profoundly different than what
we now call adjudication; indeed, it might not be adjudication at all.
B. The PotentialRoles of Legal Magic
1. Legal Magic May Enhance the Power of Official Legal Outcomes Through
Its Enacted Conflict
Sorcery is above all directed to the contradictions, discordancies, and
incompatibilities of life worlds as these are brought together in the immediacy
of personal experience. In other words, sorcery is a form whose apparently
irrational structure manifests the irrationalities and absurdities of the
world ....
Bruce Kapferer

235

Analyses of the social constitutive aspect of law tend to focus on nonofficial
ways in which law interacts with cultural norms. Robert Cover's early
influential work emphasizes religious, personal, and often resistant sources of
legal meaning.236 For Cover, similar to judicial precedents, the abolition
movement or the Jehovah's witnesses, for example, are sources of
constitutional law. He points out that the strength of legal interpretation
generated by these sources depends on individual and group commitments to

233 See, Allen, Just Words, supra note 49, at 608-10.
234. TURNER, DRAMA, supra note 165, at 57.
235. KAPFERER, FEAST OF THE SORCERER, supra note 14, at 15.
236. Robert Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed and the Role, 20
GA. L. REV. 815 (1986); Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1628-29 (1986) [hereinafter
Cover, Violence]; Cover, Nomos, supra note 24, at 7-8.
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live and interpret their lives according to the principles those interpretations
embody. 237 Thus, a community's lived commitment can often make
nonjudicial legal meanings more vital than the official ones, which lack the
moral and affective force such committed experience provides and depend on
violent enforcement for their priority.
The reanalysis of the Realists' legal magic suggests that the ritual symbolic
aspects of adjudication may substitute for the lived commitment that animates
nonjudicial interpretations of legal norms. Perhaps the development of
adjudicated law through ritual action imbues official legal interpretations with
some of the affective and moral force generated by the kind of lived
commitment Cover associates with religious and communal norms. For
instance, the link between precedential language and physical action may
impart to judges' words a ritual version of the lived commitment to
constitutional interpretation Cover found among civil rights activists and
religious resisters. 238 The metaphorical connections in legal doctrine that the
Realists criticized as illusory and incoherent may foster public identification
with official legal determinations. Explicating Turner's theory of symbolic
communication in Ndembu rituals of transformation, Catherine Bell explains,
"The mobilization of such symbols in ritual involves a dynamic exchange
between their two poles:
the orchestration of the sensory experiences
associated with such symbols can effectively embed their allied ideological
values into people's consciousness, endowing the ideological with sensory
power and the sensory with moral power." 239 Thus, "the ritual provides
tangible and compelling personal experiences of the rightness and naturalness
of the group's moral values.
It makes the values the stuff of one's own
240
experience of the world.
In Turner's theories, ritual symbolism serves to embody intangible and
previously unknown qualities. Turner notes that the Ndembu term for a ritual
symbol means literally "to blaze a trail" by marking trees "to serve as guides
back from the unknown bush to known paths." 241 A symbol, he concludes, "is
a blaze or a landmark, something that connects the unknown with the
known. ' 242
By superimposing conversations about what Arnold called
society's insoluble problems onto the ritual conflict between litigants,
adjudication may "make visible" legal norms that "cannot directly be
perceived" and activate the official applications of those norms with the energy

237. Cover, Nomos, supra note 24, at 44-45.

238. Cover, Nomos, supra note 24, at 26-40 (analyzing jurisgenerative process of religious groups in
modifying constitutional interpretations).
239. BELL, supra note 218, at 41.
240. BELL, supra note 218, at 41.
241. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 48.
242. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 48.
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243
of the particular, personal real-world conflict at stake.
Adjudication has long been seen as a socially preferable substitute for the
violent personal and group conflicts that are presumed to be the alternative if
court process were not available to resolve disputes. 244 But rather than simply
providing an outlet for personal disputes, adjudication may also use these
conflicts to energize official legal interpretation. Turner's analyses suggest that
the ritual conflict of adjudication may allow legal proceedings to produce legal
norms and determination, whose meaning reverberates with some of the same
moral affective power Cover observed coming from communities' living out
245
their normative commitments.
Although we often think of lawsuits as primarily aimed at controlling
individual conflict and imposing doctrinal order on the chaos of everyday life,
the ritual-symbolic view of adjudication reveals how litigation carries the
energetic conflict of everyday life into legal structures. In the process, legal
structures may be energized and transformed. As Mary Douglas comments,
"[r]itual recognizes the potency of disorder." 246 Chaos is overcome by
channeling chaotic energy into chaos-limiting principles. The process is one of
constant exchange, involving a continuous reordering and reshaping of these
principles.
Adjudication could not continue to exist without disorder. "Betwixt and
between" the assertion of legal rights and duties at the beginning of the lawsuit
and the legal structure affirmed at the end, a transformative sequence of events
unfolds. 247 In that liminal phase-the time in between the filing of the
complaint and the court's decision-the real life discord generating the lawsuit
begets a doctrinal argument that throws into conflict and questions previously
settled legal norms and principles. Lawyers depend on disorder for their
livelihood, trafficking in everything that undermines social order and making
institutions insecure as they advocate for their clients.
The formal categories of doctrinal thought are employed in the ritual of
adjudication not only to affirm existing legal structures but also to disrupt them.
Jeremy Waldron points out that a litigator's arguments make "institutions

243. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 49-50. "One aspect of the process of ritual
symbolization among the Ndembu is, therefore, to make visible, audible, and tangible beliefs, ideas, values,
sentiments, and psychological dispositions that cannot directly be perceived." Id.
244. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precisionand Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV.1329, 1376 (1971).
245. See Cover, Nomos, supra note 24, at 30. "There is a powerful, almost physical image at work in the
conception to which Amish and Mennonites implicitly appeal in their constitutional confession." Id.
246. DOUGLAS, PURITY, supra note 16, at 95.
247. See TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 93-94. Turner used this phrase to describe the
central, liminal part in the three-phase ritual structure theorized originally by Arnold Van Gennep. Id. at 93.
This is the period in a transformational rite of passage, during which the participants leave behind their
previous social identities before assuming their transformed roles. Id. at 94. In this phase, "the state of the
ritual subject.., is ambiguous; he passes through a realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or
coming state .... " Id. at 94.
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'questionable, ambiguous and insecure' as the lawyer struggles to find an
opportunity or an exception in the rules and the formalities for the ambitions or
predicament of his client." 248 Opposing counsel may manipulate doctrinal
concepts to present conflicting and disparate views of the dispute at hand.
Consequently, litigation, when practiced by skilled advocates, leads to a period
of ambiguity during which both the parties' fortunes and the doctrines invoked
to determine them are up for grabs. During the liminal phase of adjudication,
the formal conventions of legal doctrine carry the disruption of the particular
parties' lives deeper and wider into society's political, economic, and social
structures by symbolically articulating the particular dispute as a categorical
conflict related to past, present, and future conflicts.
In the process of adjudication, then, real life danger and chaos are not so
much rejected, as Frank complained, as symbolically reenacted and reorganized
in ways that inform legal meanings. The energy to reanimate or disintegrate
familiar social values, embodied in the legal norms employed in adjudication
derives from the social conflicts enacted in the adjudicative ritual. From a
functionalist perspective, "[t]he raw energies of conflict are domesticated into
the service of social order., 249 Or, from a poststructuralist view, adjudication's
ritual mode is a "strategic practice[] for transgressing and reshuffling cultural
categories in order to meet the need of real situations. 25 ° Both possibilities are
there. The key point is that the ability of law's ritual-magic mode to channel
conflict may be a resource for generating and enlivening legal meaning.
I want to emphasize that I am articulating a role of legal conflict and its
affective component differently from the usual analysis of court process as a
substitute for individual violence or an opportunity for a cathartic release of
built-up social tensions. In my view, the ritual structure feeds rather than
subdues emotional responses. The aspect of Tumer's theory that I am focusing
on here is the sense in which "ritual does not really resolve social conflicts and
result in social equilibrium; instead, the ritual dramatizes the tensions in a
context in which the simultaneous expression of overarching social bonds and
symbols of unity facilitates the ongoing dynamics that make up the processes of
real social life." 251 Likewise, Arnold suggested that genuine conflicts between
social norms are not resolved through trial dramas. Instead, his notion was that
trials provided an opportunity to discuss the "unsolvable problems" of society
in a coherent way.
In adjudication, social issues at stake are not discussed and debated in a
discursive analytical way, or woven into a story told from beginning to end, but
248. See Jeremy Waldron, Dirty Little Secret, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 510, 526 (1998) (quoting EDMUND
BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 43 (L. G. Mitchell ed., Oxford Press 1993) (1790))
(considering whether litigious nature of attorneys fosters revolutionary consequences).
249. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 39.
250. BELL, supra note 218, at 78 (describing Pierre Bourdieu's practice theory).
251. BELL, supra note 218, at 55.
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are rather enacted in rituals whose mind-numbingly boring repeated routines
are punctuated unpredictably with heated emotional disorder. In fact, in
adjudication, social norms and conflicts never appear in a straightforward,
representational, and linear fashion that would speak directly as a coherent
narrative or argument about the social reasons for the obligations that will be
imposed at the end of the hearing. Instead, those issues emerge only indirectly
in ritual enactments that will change the relationships, status, and lives of some
of the participants. Official legal norms are not just discussed, narrated, or
imposed through threat of force; they are also embodied in a ritual conflict that
engages participants in emotionally intense, morally committed action.
Considered in this light, official interpretations of law begin to look more like
the unofficial legal meanings that Cover argued developed through committed
moral action in individuals' lives.
But can law legitimately partake of such affective power? In illuminating
the role of violent enforcement in law, and the way the mobilization of such
violence sets judicial interpretations apart from other sources of legal meaning,
Cover acknowledged that law's violence is a necessary attribute in a society
governed by the rule of law:
As long as death and pain are part of our political world, it is essential that they
be at the center of law. The alternative is truly unacceptable-that they be
within our polity but outside the discipline of the collective decision
rules and
252
the individual efforts to achieve outcomes through those rules.
The role of legal magic may be justified in a similar way. Unless there are
ways to imbue official legal interpretations with the kind of lived, affective
moral commitment Cover finds in unofficial legal meanings, adjudication's
power to alter social reality and reshape everyday experience will only be
experienced as a violent suppression of moral commitments and cultural
meanings. I propose that the ritual-magic mode of adjudication may provide a
mechanism for imbuing official interpretations and applications of legal norms
with the affective force of moral commitments that develop through lived
experience.
2. The Magic of Impartiality
Magic affects its practitioners. Even if doctrines, precedents, and formalities
do not cause judges' decisions, as the Realists asserted, they may shape their
decision-making process. The Realists assumed without argument that any
such effect was detrimental. Here, I want to consider how legal magic might
contribute to judicial impartiality without substantively directing legal

252.

Cover, Violence, supra note 235, at 1628.
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outcomes.
Recent research attempting to quantify the effects of judges' personal
253
political perspectives on their rulings has yielded some intriguing results.
The studies confirm that among federal appellate judges, the party affiliation of
the president who appointed a judge is a fairly strong predictor of how the
judge will rule in some types of cases whose outcomes are ideologically
polarized. In other words, appellate judges appointed by Republican presidents
tend to rule in ways generally perceived as consistent with conservative
ideology, and judges appointed by Democrats more often make rulings
consistent with liberal positions. For example, Cass Sunstein and his
colleagues found that on appellate panels composed of three Democratic
appointees, judges voted in favor of sex discrimination plaintiffs 75% of the
time. 254 In contrast, panels made up of all Republican appointees judges were
far less sympathetic to plaintiffs in such cases, ruling for them only 31% of the
time. 255 Similar trends were found for cases involving affirmative action,
sexual harassment, disability, corporate liability, campaign finance, and
environmental regulation. 256 In some other politically controversial areas,
however, no such partisan trends appeared. Decisions in criminal appeals,
25 7
takings cases, and federalism cases showed no significant ideological bias.
Such studies confirm a political bias among appellate judges that hardly
seems to need confirmation. Every person has her own perspective on the
world, shaped in part by politics. Moreover, federal judges often have
expressed strong support for, or even worked to promote, one or another party's
policy agenda prior to their appointment. It would be quite surprising to find
that judges' political principles vaporized upon their taking up positions on the
bench. The question is whether the practices of appellate judging in any way
neutralize those biases.
The study by Sunstein and his colleagues produced two findings that suggest
adjudication does shift judges' ordinary subjective viewpoint. First, the study
found an interesting effect on case outcomes when appellate panels are
politically mixed-that is, when two Democratic appointees sit with one
Republican or vice versa. In such situations, the ideological effect of the

253. Cass Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideologtcal Voting on Federal Courts of
Appeals: A PreliminaryInvestigation, 90 VA. L. REv. 301,320 (2004) (hereinafter Sunstein].
254. Id. at 320.
255. Id. Another study of the D.C. Circuit showed that panels composed of all Democratic appointees or
all Republican appointees deferred to agency decisions in only 33% of cases where the panel's politics
apparently diverged from the agency's decision, but deferred in 71% of the cases where the agency decision
under review appeared consistent with the panel's politics. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanshipand Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE

L. J. 2155, 2172 (1988).
256. Sunstein, supra note 254, at 320-23.
257. Sunstein, supra note 254, at 325-27.
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majority's political affiliation is significantly weakened.
In the sex
discrimination cases, for instance, although three-Democrat panels ruled for
plaintiffs 75% of the time, panels composed of two Democrats and one
Republican ruled for plaintiffs in only 49% of cases. 259 Recall that a two-judge
majority has every bit as much legal power as a unanimous panel to decide the
outcome of a case, yet the presence of a single Republican judge greatly
reduced the chances that a two-Democrat majority would exercise that power.
Similar effects have been found in other case areas and with panels composed
of two Republicans and one Democrat. Second, as already noted, the study
showed that no partisan effects were found in several areas generally
considered politically controversial. Moreover, as the authors point out, the
study shows that "even when party effects are significant, they are not
overwhelmingly large." 260 Both Democratic and Republican appointees voted
against stereotypical
partisan interest in more than one-third of the cases
261
studied.
The authors suggest possible explanations for these results that reflect their
own jurisprudential perspective, which might be characterized as liberal legalprocess doctrinalism modified with a dose of Realism. In the case of panel
effects that seem to neutralize politics, they suggest that a possible explanation
is that the judge in the political minority is able "to call the panel's attention to
the tension between its inclination and the decided cases." 262 Assume that the
existing precedent is "not entirely clear," they say, "but that fairly applied," it
dictates one outcome. 263 In such a situation, "fallible human beings might well
be inclined to understand the law in a way that fits with their own
predilections.' 264 But, they hypothesize, a judge with a different ideological
perspective can point out to the others how they are being swayed by ideology
and help them to recognize that the existing legal precedents actually call for a
different result. 265 Where no political effects materialized, the authors propose
that the observed effects are the result of either ideological unanimity across
party affiliation or the 26existence
of "binding precedent" under prevailing legal
6
doctrines and case law.

From the perspective of legal magic, however, we can imagine a third
possible explanation worth studying as a possible cause of the apparent
mitigation of judges' personal political ideologies in their legal determinations.
It would be very interesting to see whether in cases where judges voted across
258.

Sunstein, supra note 254, at 315, 329.
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260.
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Sunstein, supra note 254,
Sunstein, supra note 254,
Sunstein, supra note 254,

263. Sunstein, supra note 254,
264. Sunstein, supra note 254,
265. Sunstein, supra note 254,
266. Sunstein, supra note 254,

at 314 tbl. 1.
at 336.
at 336.
at 344.
at 344.
at 344.
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at 334-35.
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type, there was a strong emphasis on-or notable absence of-doctrine,
precedent, and formality in their opinions. Likewise, we might study the use of
the five techniques of legal magic-enactment, heightened formality,
performativity, temporal play, and analogic connection-in conjunction with
the degree of partisanship evidenced in different judicial contexts. In other
words, one could look to see whether the incidence of voting contrary to
expected partisan interest correlated with, for instance, the presence or absence
of metaphorical doctrinal reasoning and citation to precedent in the relevant
case law, or high or low levels of procedural formality in a particular
jurisdiction. 267 One could, for instance, look to procedural forms in different
courts and different case law areas. The use of oral argument would be an
interesting variable. There is a wide variation among appellate courts today in
the use of argument. Some federal appellate courts, for instance, still provide
for oral argument in every case, while others decide most of their cases on the
briefs. Does a court's use of this form of enactment heighten, dampen, or not
affect the partisan tendencies of its judges?
In my experience, most appellate judges and advocates believe that oral
argument rarely influences a case's outcome. They point out that it is generally
easier to assess the strength of the parties' arguments and the approach of
existing case law by reading the briefs and relevant decisions. Despite the view
that appellate argument has little instrumental value, many practitioners and
some judges continue to value it highly. At least one judge describes the
importance of oral argument in terms that are resonant of the argument I made
above about the importance of legal ritual for imbuing legal norms with
tangible value: "It is the right to be heard made concrete, or, in biblical
language, the 'word made flesh."' 268 Oral argument may well have value as a
symbolic "hearing" that contributes to people's satisfaction with judicial
outcomes. 269 But in this section, I am considering the possibility that the real
time performance of the parties' arguments may actually contribute to judicial
impartiality.
It is important to see that the magic-ritual effect I am hypothesizing here is
nonsubstantive. In other words, it does not depend on the assumption of
Sunstein and his colleagues that the shift in legal outcomes for mixed panels
reflects an objectively present substantive rule provided by the existing case
law that should determine, or at least steer, legal outcomes once partisan bias is
suppressed.
Rather, an approach to legal magic informed by modem

267. A research project that would address some of these issues is currently in the design phase, overseen
by Oscar Chase of New York University.
268. Gilbert S. Memtt, The Decision Making Process in Federal Courts ofAppeals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.1385,
1387 (1990).

269. Studies suggest that claimaints' satisfaction is related not only to legal outcome but also to the
opportunity to appear and be heard. Tom R. Tyler, A PsychologicalPerspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort
Claims, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 204 (1990).
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anthropological theories of magic opens the possibility that the symbolic ritual
elements in doctrine and the adjudicative process might suppress partisan bias
without providing direction about substantive results. In this view, the magicritual mode of adjudication may facilitate judges' move away from their
ordinary personal outlook without moving them toward any particular
decisional outcome. While agreeing with the Realist conclusion that legal
magic does not substantively determine legal outcomes, this approach envisions
the use of legal magic to achieve results Realists would admire.
3. Restorative Legal Magic
Things come and depart: the soul comes back to the body, fever is driven
away. An attempt is made to make sense of an accumulation of images. The
bewitched person is ill, lame, imprisoned. Somebody has broken his bones,
dried up his marrow, peeled off his skin. The favourite image is of something
holding him, and it is tied or untied ....
Marcel Mauss

27 0

[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy ....
27 1

Marbury v. Madison

I want to suggest that the ritual-magic mode of modem adjudication may
correspond to another feature adjudication shares with magic in other settings:
an avowed goal of re-forming the past. At least at the level of ordinary
language, adjudication is concerned with remaking the past. We speak in a
contracts action of placing the injured party in the position in which she would
find herself if the agreement had never been breached. In tort suits, we strive to
"make whole" a person injured, often in ways that are irredeemable in a
physical or technical sense. Indeed, what Douglas observes of ritual in general
is definitively true of the ritual of adjudication: "what has passed is restated so
that what ought to have been prevails over what was ....2 72
This reversibility is, of course, anything but realistic. In this embodied life,
we can only go forward. Glance at the clock and discover that the morning set
aside for writing has been wasted on household chores and the newspaper; you
cannot have those hours back. More dramatically, the moment after your car
crashes into the one ahead of you, or you swallow some foreign object inside a
soft drink, there is no return to the world just before disaster struck. In an
instant, reality is reoriented. Whatever damage is done cannot be undone, or
270.
271.
272.

MAUSS,supra note 14, at 61.
5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
DOUGLAS, PURITY, supra note 16, at 68.

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. XLI:773

can it? In life, not usually, but in ritual, certainly, and that includes the ritual
mode of adjudication. In life, things break. While sometimes we can repair
them, they are never the same again, and many injuries are irreparable. But law
is different, for laws are made to be broken.
Above all, legal magic enacts a form of scripted action that stands in for
inchoate, chaotic, and uncontrolled experience of real life in order to transform
real life. Once again, the crucial thing to recognize-in order to relate
adjudication to this kind of magical symbolic undoing of past events-is that
magic aims to reorient social reality. Formal ritual symbolism reinterprets
physical finality in terms of potential social transformation. All real-time
events have a social as well as a physical level. By substituting a symbolicmetaphoric world for technical physical reality, magic reorders the disruptions
of illness, accident, and even death. Magic reorders them-that is, in terms of
their social meaning and effects.
Victor Turner argued that the Ndembu Milk Tree stood at once for the
theoretically timeless tribal social structure and that most deeply time- and
body-bound affective relationship between an individual mother and her
nursing infant.273 Likewise, the doctrine of precedent embodies both the ideal
reversibility of the (legal) injury and the fundamental irreversibility of our
embodied existence. Precedent allows judges to talk to one another through
their opinions across history as though no temporal or mortal limits exist.
Elizabeth Mertz has pointed out that even when a judicial opinion emphasizes
historical disjunctions in social settings and understandings of legal norms-as,
for instance, when Brown v. Board of Education reinterpreted Plessy's
understanding of equal protection-the overarching "narrative convention that
permits the two texts to speak to one another across such radically different
contexts" emphasizes "the power of legal [language] across these social
changes. ' 274 Just as magic spells and legal doctrines exaggerate the metaphoric
capacity of ordinary language to create heightened forms of symbolic
association, law's triumph over historic time results from an exaggeration of
ordinary notions of history. As Carol Greenhouse notes, common law both
"reflects perfectly a logic of linear time, in its reliance on precedent" and
"involves larger claims beyond linear time." 275 The doctrine of precedent
reifies and takes to extremes the embodied psychophysical reality of
legal system, as Greenhouse puts it, law
irreversible time. In a precedential
"accumulates, but it never passes ' 276
But the precedents that incorporate this extreme irreversibility are then
273. DOUGLAS, PURITY, supra note 16, at 56.

274. Elizabeth Mertz, Consensus and Dissent in U.S. Legal Opinions: Narrative Structure and Social
Voices, in DISORDERLY DISCOURSE 150 (Charles L. Briggs ed., 1996).

275. Carol J.Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the CulturalLegitimation of Law, 98 YALE L.J.
1631, 1640 (1989).

276. Id.
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applied to reverse damage and disorder reconceived as legal transgressions.
Thus, precedent approaches transcendence and the achievement of its timeless
opposite: reversibility. "Because it is timeless, legality is not only cumulative
and expansive but reversible. The past can meet and control the present, but
the present can reverse the past as well. 2 77 This is the magic reversal. That
which is ordinarily irreversible-the real life effects of embodied existencehas become amenable to remedy, while the ordinarily intangible, malleable
stuff of abstract thought and expression has hardened into irreversibility.
Through precedent, the past words of judges meet and control the present, and
the energy of the present disorder that is legally reversed is absorbed back into
the precedential rule, proving and increasing its potency. The past, in the form
of precedential judicial language controls the results of the present adjudication
Past events are
so that the present adjudication can reverse real life.
transformed into legal injury or a "lawbreaking" that the subsequent
adjudication either identifies and remedies or determines never occurred in the
first place.
But legal magic's treatment of time is not entirely transcendent. The
doctrine of precedent imports to judicial language the irrevocability of physical
action. By accepting an irreversibility akin to that of physical acts, judges'
precedential language acquires an unusually active quality that might increase
our sense of its power to affect social reality. 278 In adjudication, then, the
embodied reality of one-directional time and irrevocable physical action is
flattened and denied as timeless doctrinal formulas are applied to ritually
remake the past. Judges defy mortal limits to converse with one another across
centuries. But temporal limits are shifted onto adjudication's ritual language.
It is judges' words that can never be wholly undone, not the real-world
situations in which they intervene.
In the everyday physical world, generally speaking, what's done is done.
Not so in adjudication, where the past can be reworked according to legal
But the ordinary, uncancellable contingency of the embodied
concepts.
temporal world comes back through the doctrine of precedent. Judges absorb
some of this physical irrevocability into their words. The meaning of those
words may be subsequently modified. Indeed, in a common-law system, every
subsequent application of a precedent affects the system, just as every daily act
affects our bodies. Subsequent cases must take account of previous decisions
in the same way each of our acts tomorrow is in part determined by what we do
today.

277. EwICK & SILBEY, COMMON PLACE, supra note 27, at 95.
278. It is also interesting to consider how this duality might be related to the one that Tambiah pointed out
through which magic language grammatically addresses the inanimate world (like a physical intervention) but
apparently takes effect through its persuasion of people. See TAMBIAH, MAGIC, supra note 16, at 81-83.
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Thus, in adjudication, we act as if the real-world events at the center of the
case-the crime, accident, or breach of promise-are reversible. But judges'
precedential language acquires the action-like quality of irrevocability that
normally attends real physical life. Through the ritual-magic technique of
precedent, a potential for order and control is symbolically imposed on the reallife situation at hand. Meanwhile, the symbolic structure itself (i.e., the
practice of precedent) seems to have absorbed some of the uncontrollable
chanciness of ordinary embodied existence.
The Victorians, and the Realists, saw magic rituals as naive or fraudulent
attempts to automatically reverse irreversible physical processes and deny
But modem field anthropologists recognized that "instrumental
reality.
efficacy is not the only kind of efficacy to be derived from.., symbolic
action." 279 As Evans-Pritchard reminds us, even "death is not only a natural
fact but also a social fact." 280 Magic practitioners may or may not hope that a
ritual or sacrifice can reverse the natural fact of death, but at its primary level,
the symbolic ritual reversal enacts "a social triumph over death.",28 ' Likewise,
law substitutes a symbolic-metaphoric world of doctrine for real-life conflict
and damage, and with the resolution of the doctrinal conflict, enacts a social
triumph over disorder and injury. But in the process, legal principles are
themselves temporarily disordered and sometimes reorganized. The structures
of law are energized and strengthened in their original or new configuration not
only by the power of the real-life destruction and damage they are called upon
to realign, but also paradoxically, by being broken themselves. In the physical
world, when things get broken, they usually become less themselves, at least
With laws it is just
temporarily, and sometimes lose their identity altogether.
282
exist.
to
ceases
broken
never
is
that
the reverse: a law
Once again, then, from a Realist perspective, the magic-ritual mode of law
looks like the Victorian evolutionist concept of magic as it appears to embody a
childish and mistaken view about the nature of the physical universe. In life,
when things break it is often unexpected and usually problematic. They either
stay broken, or they are repaired in a way that does not restore them to their
former unbroken condition. But laws, like many children's toys, are made to
be broken and put back together over and over in a seemingly endless series of
enactments of perfect reversibility. In fact, there is a whole genre of baby and
toddler merchandise the hallmark of which is its capacity for being taken apart
279. DOUGLAS, PURITY, supra note 16, at 69.
280. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFT, supra note 14, at 25.
281. DOUGLAS, PURITY, supra note 16, at 69.
282. This is most obvious with common law, where no written statutes exist in books ahead of time to
draw a line between legalality and illegality, where the determination of the law is m some sense always
retrospective, arising out of someone's claim that breakage has occurred. Even legal codes, however, lose
authority when no one breaks them; for laws that go unbroken go unenforced and unnoticed and eventually fall
into obsolescence. Those dead or dormant laws will only be revived as significant in anyone's mind at the
point that someone breaks one.
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and put back together again. 283 My personal favorite was a set of "slicing
vegetables"-tomatoes, eggplants, peppers-each cunningly molded into two
pieces held together with Velcro to form a single vegetable shape. Each could
be endlessly sliced with a plastic knife and then rejoined into a whole. Law is
that sort of object: not merely capable of being broken and repaired, but
largely defined by that capacity. Like the Velcro tomato, it exists to be broken
and reshaped again and again and again. The reversible vegetables provide
tangible proof to young children of their effect on the world. Likewise, law's
endless capacity to be broken and restored constantly demonstrates and
reaffirms a society's capacity to transform and restore reality.2 84
Here again, the insights of anthropology can shed new light on this
apparently primitive outlook. For in the law's ritual reversibility of injuries,
ontogeny does not mirror phylogeny. Young children cannot distinguish
between reparable and irreparable damage. As a toddler, my daughter did not
understand that her powers of repair were limited to toys. She would gleefully
rip flowers out of the ground, tear off their petals, and then try to replant them.
In contrast, practitioners of ritual magic distinguish between categories of
social and physical facts and causes, and thus, between those injuries that are
amenable to legal restoration and injuries that are not. The reversibility of legal
magic may play a hitherto unstated role in our legal system's ability to "grant
relief," i.e., to generate remedies for legal injuries that are both psychologically
satisfying on an individual level and socially restorative. Trobriand magic first
transforms individual villagers' hunger pains into a potential weakness in the
yamhouse structure, which, when remedied, generates a sense of increased
plenty and stability in the village. In a parallel way, a lawsuit transforms the
physical and emotional injuries and violation of, say, a car wreck into a
doctrinal conflict about proximate cause, the resolution of which reinforces the
notion that our global village can come to terms with the mortal speed and risks
of a motorized world.
It is as though dysfunction-pain, want, misfortune, conflict-carries a kind
of energy that both magic and legal systems recognize and aim to transform
283. Small children are fascinated with the damage they can cause. Developmentally, children's first sense
of their own ability to affect the world comes through the capacity to break stuff. Long before they can
establish themselves creatively, children are capable of spectacular destruction. Destruction as a mode of
identity development is not confined to toddlers. Elaine Scarry points to the repeated instances of divine
wounding and destroying as the way in which the God of the Old Testament achieves tangible reality. ELAINE
SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 198-205 (1985).
284. In fact, law may be the premiere example of a general category of things that can be broken and then
thoroughly restored. Or perhaps we should say that law aims at the symbolic effect of all such objects:
affirming our power to deliberately intervene in and reshape the effects of our actions. Jerome Frank would
undoubtedly characterize this view of law as wish fulfillment. In some undeniable sense, both toys and law
fulfill the magical wish to go back and undo something you have just done, to perfectly reverse an action so
that no one could ever know that the original ac:ion had even taken place at all, so that no one would ever feel
any of its consequences. But at the same time, they are recognizably not real; they fulfill that wish
symbolically
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into positive personal or social power. The Ndembu translate misfortune in
hunting as a violation of ancestral duties. When that violation is recompensed
in what Turner called the "rituals of affliction," the disruptive energy of the
hunting misfortune reverses to confer unusual healing power on the formerly
afflicted individual. In the process, the ritual reconfirms the traditional social
285
structure by demonstrating its power to overcome and transform misfortune.
Likewise adjudication first transforms individual conflict, pain, and violence
into lawbreaking, a kind of damage that is by definition reversible, and then by
legally remedying it, reaffirms our society's ability to overcome social chaos,
to reverse time and reorder social reality.
V. CONCLUSION

As provocative as it may sound, law as magic is no more outlandish than law
as literature or law as nothing but the prediction of what judges and other
government officials will do. H.L.A. Hart calls these kinds of jurisprudential
redefinitions "great exaggerations" that are at once "illuminating and
puzzling." 286 Like these other theories, my analysis of adjudication as ritual
magic is meant to highlight neglected truths about our legal system. In the
process, I ignore or downplay other better recognized features. The aim is to
bring to light a dimension of law that is at once taken for granted and largely
invisible. Moreover, it strikes me as worthy of further investigation that a
social institution avowedly devoted to truth and reason, but perennially
criticized as false and irrational, looks so much like a set of social practices
traditionally viewed as false and irrational, though more recently interpreted as
reasonably effective in their own social contexts.
In my reanalysis of legal magic, I aim to suspend judgment about its
normative significance. Still, I recognize that the tone of my discussion is
optimistic, even idealistic. That optimism is in part driven by a personal desire,
perhaps a personal need, to believe that the practice of law has real potential for
enriching and transforming our society. As James Boyd White remarked, if
"we can imagine law as an activity that in its ideal form, at least on occasions,
has true intellectual, imaginative, ethical and political worth[,]" then we will
find "both something to aim for and a more workable and trustworthy ground
for the criticism of what we see around us." '287 Nevertheless, I do not mean to
suggest that a more idealistic view of the ritual-magic techniques of
adjudication should replace the Realists' critique. The Realists catalogued and
demystified legal magic and exposed the ways in which law's magical features

285. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 164, at 9-15. As one of Turner's Ndembu collaborators
expressed it, "What hurts you, when discovered and propitiated, helps you." Id. at 133.
286. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 2 (1961).
287. Milner S. Ball & James B. White, A Conversation Between Milner Ball and James Boyd White, 8
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 465, 468 (1996).
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can masquerade as objective truth and costume politics as nature. They showed
convincingly that legal magic, like other forms of magic, can be used to screen
ulterior motives and to carry out projects of social dominance. But unless we
read these critiques as ultimately counseling that we dismantle our legal
system, we must look for clues they provide about law's potential as well as
law's limits.
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